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THE CONTRIBUTION OF EU LAW TO THE
REGULATION OF ONLINE SPEECH
THE GLAWISCHNIG-PIESCZEK CASE AND WHAT
IT MEANS FOR ONLINE CONTENT REGULATION
Luc von Danwitz*
Internet regulation in the European Union (EU) is receiving significant
attention and criticism in the United States. The European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) judgment in the case Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland, in which the ECJ found a take-down order against Facebook for defamatory content with global effect permissible under EU law, was closely
scrutinized in the United States. These transsystemic debates are valuable
but need to be conducted with a thorough understanding of the relevant legal framework and its internal logic. This note aims to provide the context
to properly assess the role the ECJ and EU law play in the regulation of
online speech. The note argues that the alleged shortcomings of the Glawischnig-Piesczek case are actually the result of a convincing interpretation
of the applicable EU law while respecting the prerogatives of the member
states in the areas of speech regulation, jurisdiction, and comity. Most of
the issues that commentators wanted the ECJ to decide were beyond its
reach in this case. The paper argues that EU law’s contribution in the field
of online speech regulation should be regarded as a realization of the dangers of illegal online content, resulting in an effective protection of the interests harmed. This implies the rejection of a “whack-a-mole” approach
towards illegal online content in favor of more effective ways to protect
against the harm caused by illegal online speech. At the same time, the case
highlights the necessity to establish a workable theory of jurisdiction and
comity in the digital age.
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Introduction
With increasing regularity, the judiciary of the European Union (EU) is
making headlines across the Atlantic. The Court of Justice of the European
Union (ECJ or “the Court”) may still seem to be “tucked away in the fairy1
land Duchy of Luxembourg” for the general American public, but its rul-

*
Licencié en droit (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne), Mag. Iur. (Rheinische
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn), LL.M. (University of Michigan). Research fellow in
the project “Handbook of Constitutional Law – German Constitutional Law from a Transnational Perspective” at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law, the
University of Bonn, and the University of Freiburg. Contact: l.von-danwitz@csl.mpg.de. I
would like to thank Prof. Daniel Halberstam for his useful insights and detailed comments on
earlier drafts of this paper, as well as his continuing support, mentorship, and guidance.
Thanks to Dr. Andrew Woodhouse for helpful comments and Prof. Brian Willen for his fascinating course on U.S. Internet Law. I am grateful for the invaluable support I received from
MTLR’s editorial team in publishing this note. All remaining errors are my own.
1.
Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75
AM. J. INT’L. L. 1, 1 (1981).
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ings become increasingly important for the United States, most notably in
areas of regulation that challenge both the United States and the EU.
One such judgment was delivered in October 2019 in the case Eva
2
Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland. The judgment dealt with the
sensitive topic of content removal from Facebook, specifically concerning
defamatory speech directed against an Austrian politician. The ECJ allowed
the Austrian Supreme Court to issue an injunction against Facebook with a
global reach to take down content that was identical or equivalent to the initial content identified as defamatory under Austrian law. The case has been
thoroughly commented on outside of Europe. The American response was
3
overwhelmingly negative.
Topics that transcend jurisdictions, like online content regulation, can
only benefit from a discourse across legal systems. Courts all over the world
have struggled with similar questions. Competing visions for the future of
the Internet are debated, tested, and rejected by lawmakers on all continents.
External perspectives on local solutions with global consequences are extremely valuable. To be fruitful, however, such debates presuppose a thorough understanding of the legal questions implicated. Accordingly, this note
aims to provide the context necessary to understand the role of EU law and
the ECJ in the regulation of online speech as exemplified by GlawischnigPiesczek. By undertaking a critical analysis of the judgment and its broader
regulatory context, this note will distill and critically evaluate the key takeaways from the judgment, while pointing out the limits of EU law in this
area.
This note shows that the provisions the ECJ interpreted in GlawischnigPiesczek focus exclusively on the obligations of intermediary service providers (ISPs) when confronted with illegal content. This severely limits the
scope of the judgment. These obligations, the note suggests, were more narrowly interpreted by the ECJ than a cursory reading of Glawischnig2.
Case
C-18/18,
Glawischnig-Piesczek
v.
Facebook
Ireland
Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821 (Oct. 3, 2019). The final judgment in this case was delivered by the
Austrian Supreme Court in 2020, ruling in favor of Ms. Glawischnig-Pisczek. See Oberster
Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Sept. 15, 2020, 6 Ob 195/19y, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at
/Dokumente/Justiz/JJT_20200915_OGH0002_0060OB00195_19Y0000_000/JJT_20200915_
OGH0002_0060OB00195_19Y0000_000.pdf.
3.
See Jennifer Daskal & Kate Klonick, When a Politician Is Called a ‘Lousy Traitor,’
Should Facebook Censor It?, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/06/27/opinion/facebook-censorship-speech-law.html; Dominic Dhil Panakal, Europe’s
Bridge Too Far, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library
/detail.aspx?g=521ee566-425c-4280-b0e0-ffafe6487b72; Daphne Keller, Dolphins in the Net:
Internet Content Filters and the Advocate General’s Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Opinion, STANFORD CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Sept. 4, 2019),
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/Dolphins-in-the-Net-AG-Analysis.pdf; Daphne Keller, Facebook Filters, Fundamental Rights, and the CJEU’s Glawischnig-Piesczek Ruling, 69 GRUR
INT’L 616, 620–22 (2020); Daphne Keller (@daphnehk), TWITTER (Oct. 3, 2019, 9:29 AM),
https://twitter.com/daphnehk/status/1179750220864745472.
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Piesczek might suggest. The note also maintains that EU law as it currently
stands cannot get involved in the heated debate about when to regulate
online speech, a question which is left to the EU member states. Also, the
interpretation of the obligations of service providers, somewhat counterintuitively, mostly is not open to influence from the guarantee of the freedom of
4
speech in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). The note further
maintains that allowing member states to issue orders to remove content
with global effect shows due deference to the national competences in these
areas, while also insisting on the applicable rules of comity and jurisdiction.
With all this in mind, the note argues that the main contribution of EU law
as interpreted by the ECJ to the debate around online content regulation is
an emphasis on efficient removal of illegal content and the insistence on the
responsibilities of service providers in that regard. The note does not pretend to spell out and solve the difficult transatlantic relationship regarding
Internet regulation. It merely attempts to set the record straight as far as the
Glawischnig-Piesczek case is concerned and to present the contributions of
this judgment to the ongoing regulatory debate.
This note begins in Part I with a brief description of the case, its procedural background and the ECJ’s judgment. Part II then presents a broad
overview of the general setting of EU Internet regulation, focusing on the E5
Commerce Directive (ECD) which was at the heart of the case under review. The judgment is then critically analyzed against the backdrop of the
most prominent critiques brought forth by commentators in Part III. This
includes the allegedly too broad interpretation of the obligations of service
providers (Part III.A), the problem of automated monitoring (Part III.B), the
perceived lack of considerations for fundamental rights involved (Part III.C)
and the global effect of removal orders that the ECJ allows national injunctions to have (Part III.D). The note proceeds in Part IV to present the main
conclusions that should be drawn from the judgment and that should be taken as the key contribution of EU law to the debate on online content regulation around the world and its possible implications for the US legal and policy debate in particular.

4.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C
326) 391 [hereinafter CFR].
5.
Directive 2000/31/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic
Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 [hereinafter ECD].
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I. Glawischnig-Piesczek—The Case and the Judgment
A. The Case

6

A Facebook user publicly shared on their personal page an article from
the Austrian online news site oe24.at, which described the Austrian Green
Party’s support to maintain a minimum income for refugees. The article was
shown as a thumbnail, including its title (“Greens: Minimum Income for
Refugees Should Stay”), a summary of the article and a photograph of Ms.
Glawischnig-Piesczek. At the time, she was a member of the Nationalrat
(Austrian National Council) for the Austrian Green Party and its federal
spokesperson. Along with the article, the user posted comments about Ms.
Glawischnig-Piesczek, calling her a “lousy traitor of the people” (“miese
7
Volksverräterin”), “corrupt oaf” (“korrupter Trampel”), and a member of a
“fascist party” (“Faschistenpartei”). Ms. Glawischnig-Piesczek asked Face8
book Ireland to remove this content, which Facebook Ireland did not do.
Ms. Glawischnig-Piesczek obtained an injunction from the Vienna
Commercial Court, which ordered Facebook to cease publication of Ms.
Glawischnig-Piesczek’s photograph accompanied by the same or ‘equivalent’ content. Facebook only took down the initial post in Austria. The Vienna Higher Regional Court mostly upheld the order on appeal. It limited
the obligation to take down equivalent content to content that was brought
to the attention of Facebook but did not limit the injunction territorially to
Austria. Both lower courts took the view that the posts were in violation of
Sec. 78 UrhG (Law on Copyright) and Sec. 1330(1) ABGB (General Civil
Code) and not protected by the freedom of expression.
Both parties appealed to the Austrian Supreme Court. This Court explicitly held that the statements at issue were intended to damage the applicant’s reputation, to insult her and to defame her, which would justify an
order to take down the initial posting. The Austrian Supreme Court stated
that under Austrian law, a worldwide order to cease and desist that extended
to identical or equivalent content would be permissible if the service pro6.
Unless otherwise noted, this part relies on the presentation of the case in the Opinion by Advocate General Szpunar. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland
Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶¶ 10–21 (June 19, 2019) (Opinion of Advocate General
Szpunar).
7.
The term “Volksverräter”, though initially coined by revolutionaries and socialists
dating back to the time before the German revolution of 1848, is today mainly understood as a
reference to National Socialist Terminology. Volksverräter, DUDEN, https://www.duden.de
/rechtschreibung/Volksverraeter (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). The term was used to describe
people involved in “high treason” according to §§ 80–93 of the German Penal Code. The infamous Volksgerichtshof (People’s Court) had special jurisdiction for these provisions and
used them to sentence many German resistance fighters to death.
8.
Facebook Ireland Ltd. is Facebook’s subsidiary for outside of the United States and
Canada. Every user outside of the United States and Canada contracts with Facebook Ireland
Ltd.
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vider was already aware that the interests of the applicant had been harmed
on at least one occasion as a result of another user’s action, which demonstrates the risk that other infringements could be committed. Importantly, it
was not the ECJ who came up with the notions of identical or equivalent
content, but the Austrian Supreme Court who decided that under national
law, a removal order extending to these categories of content was appropriate.
However, the Austrian Supreme Court was unsure whether this interpretation of Austrian law would be in accordance with art. 15(1) ECD
which reads: “Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers, when providing [information society services], to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to
seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.”
In keeping with its obligation under art. 267(3) of the Treaty on the
9
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), according to which any court
of last instance must refer a question on the validity or interpretation of EU
10
law pending before it to the ECJ, the Austrian Supreme Court stayed the
proceedings to refer questions on the interpretation of art. 15 ECD to the
ECJ. The Austrian Supreme Court asked whether and to what extent art. 15
ECD precludes national courts to order service providers to remove illegal
content as well as identical and equivalent content with worldwide effect.

B. The Judgment
The ECJ handed down its ruling on October 3, 2019. It began its analysis with a series of observations about the ECD, highlighting that Facebook
11
Ireland offered hosting services privileged by art. 14 ECD. The immunity
they enjoy according to this article does not, in the light of art. 14(3) ECD
and recital 45 ECD, preclude that national courts direct injunctions against
the provider to take down illegal content, even if the provider cannot be
12
made liable for the content. Member states must ensure corresponding
mechanisms for plaintiffs before their courts, for which they enjoy a particu13
larly wide discretion under art. 18(1) ECD. In light of the broad wording
of art. 18(1) ECD, the ECJ also considered the range of national measures to
be demanded by national courts in their injunctions against the ISPs to be
14
broad as well. The ECJ ended these preliminary remarks with a nod to art.

9.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
267, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
10.
See MORTEN BROBERG & NIELS FENGER, PRELIMINARY REFERENCES TO THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, 223–29 (2d ed. 2014).
11.
Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶¶ 22–23.
12.
Id. ¶¶ 24–25.
13.
Id. ¶¶ 26, 28–29.
14.
Id. ¶ 30.
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15 ECD and its prohibition on general monitoring obligations as a limit of
15
the member state’s injunctive power.
The ECJ first found that ordering an ISP to remove or block access to
information stored by the ISP that is “identical” to the content of information previously declared to be illegal was not a prohibited general moni16
17
toring obligation, but a specific monitoring obligation. According to the
ECJ it is “legitimate” that such injunctions are issued, regardless of who up18
loaded the illegal information, in the light of how easily such content can
19
be shared and disseminated on a social network. Finally, the ECJ reiterated
that because the content at issue is identical to content previously declared
20
to be illegal, the obligation was not a general obligation to monitor.
After dealing with identical content, the ECJ turned to the question of
whether art. 15 ECD allows for an injunction ordering the removal of content that is “equivalent” to the illegal content. The ECJ understood equivalent information to be content “which remains essentially unchanged and
therefore diverges very little from the content which gave rise to the finding
21
of illegality.” By reference to recital 41 ECD, the ECJ considered whether
the obligation to remove equivalent content properly strikes a balance be22
tween the interests of the ISP and the interests of the defamed person. In
the ECJ’s view, removal orders for equivalent content do not excessively
burden ISPs for three reasons: (1) the injunction sets out the factors that
qualify content as “equivalent,” (2) equivalent content is only content that
can be identified without an independent assessment, which (3) allows the
23
ISP to use “automated search tools and technologies.”
Finally, the ECJ turned to the question whether the ECD prohibits injunctions that require the global takedown of content. By reference to the
general lack of limits imposed on the member states by the ECD other than
in art. 15 ECD, the ECJ held that the ECD did not contain a territorial limit
24
for such injunctions. Pointing to recitals 58 and 60 of the ECD, the ECJ
25
stated only that applicable rules of international law had to be respected.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. ¶ 31.
Id. ¶ 37.
Id. ¶ 35.
Id. ¶ 37.
Id. ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 37.
Id. ¶ 39.
Id. ¶¶ 43–44.
Id. ¶ 46.
Id. ¶¶ 48–50.
Id. ¶¶ 51–52.
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II. A Brief Overview of the Relevant EU Internet Law
To give a full account of the EU’s Internet regulation and policy would
26
go beyond the limits of this note. Rather, this section only tries to introduce the key institutional and legal settings in which EU Internet regulation
operates.

A. The Market and the Individual
27

EU regulation of the Internet is, broadly speaking, driven by two main
28
concerns: the regulation of the Digital Single Market and the protection of
29
the individual in the digital era. First, the Internet has enormous economic
consequences for the European Single Market. Internet regulation quickly
30
became a necessity to ensure the survival of the Single Market. Many existing regulatory areas such as IP law became part of EU Internet regulation
because of the change the regulated area underwent as part of economic digitalization. Second, the EU also began to tackle the impact of the Internet on
private individuals by enacting consumer and data protection laws.
The enumerated powers of the EU contribute to the EU’s focus on these
two broad categories of Internet regulation. The EU does not possess general police powers. Market related Internet regulation is usually based on
art. 114 TFEU, the competence to regulate the Single Market. The ECJ had
31
ruled, as early as 2000 in the famous Tobacco Advertising case that this
was not a general power but required a genuine goal related to the Single
32
Market. Prominent legislative action by the EU in this area encompasses
33
different directives and regulations on electronic commerce.
26.
See ANDREJ SAVIN, EU INTERNET LAW 21–29 (2d ed. 2017) for further details.
27.
This paper only includes a discussion of the regulation concerning Internet providers and Internet content. EU law also significantly regulates the physical aspect of the Internet.
See PAUL NIHOUL & PETER RODFORD, EU ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS LAW 171–390
(2d ed. 2011).
28.
The European Single Market is a common market of the 27 EU member states, the
EEA states (Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland), Switzerland, and, pending a resolution of
the Brexit process, the United Kingdom. It in essence guarantees the free movement of capital, goods, services, labor, and persons. As a reaction to the digitalization of society and the
economy, the European Commission under then President Jean-Claude Juncker announced its
“Digital Single Market” policy bundle in 2015. The European Commission under its current
President Ursula von der Leyen has been pursuing a “European Digital Strategy,” expanding
on the policy goals of the previous Commission since 2019. European Commission, Shaping
Europe’s Digital Future, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/.
29.
See SAVIN, supra note 26, at 2–5.
30.
Twenty-eight of the Commission’s 30 proposals as part of the “Digital Single Market” policy were taken up by the EU’s legislature from 2015 to 2019. European Commission,
A Digital Single Market for the Benefit of All Europeans (Nov. 2019), https://ec.europa.eu
/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=53056.
31.
Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament & Council, 2000 E.C.R. I-8419.
32.
Id. ¶¶ 83–84. This case can be read as an equivalent to Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452 (1991); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); United States v. Lopez,
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Regulation concerned with the protection of the individual as a participant in the digital market is based on more specific powers. Notably, regula34
35
tion around Consumer Protection and Data Protection Regimes are usually based on art. 169 TFEU and art. 16 TFEU respectively.
Speech-related issues have not been a prominent part of EU Internet
regulation, falling in neither of the two broad fields of EU Internet regulation. Few existing EU legislative acts encounter questions of speech and
most of those only peripherally. For example, EU law extensively covers
issues of jurisdiction and choice of law under the recast Brussels I Regula36
37
tion and the Rome II Regulation applicable to torts. They may apply to
cases in which speech-related torts are at issue. But because these rules deal
with procedural aspects, they rarely, if at all, reach into the speech-related
issues under the applicable national law.
514 U.S. 549 (1995); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). However, this does
not exclude broad regulatory powers. For example, Directive 2006/24/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council (Data Retention Directive) passed on March 15, 2006, but later
invalidated by the ECJ as a violation of the CFR in Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland v. Minister for Comms., Marine & Nat. Resources, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238
(Apr. 8, 2014), based data retention legislation on the power to regulate the Single Market,
which was approved by the ECJ in Case C-301/06, Ireland v. Parliament and Council, 2009
E.C.R. I-593. See SAVIN, supra note 26, at 20.
33.
See, e.g., ECD, supra note 5; Directive 2006/123, of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 12 December 2006 on Services in the Internal Market, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 36;
Directive 2009/110, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on
the Taking up, Pursuit and Prudential Supervision of the Business of Electronic Money Institutions, 2009 O.J. (L 267) 7–17; Regulation 910/2014, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 July 2014 on Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions in the Internal market, 2014 O.J. (L 257) 73.
34.
See, e.g., Directive 2011/83, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
October 2011 on Consumer Rights, Amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive
1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council Directive
85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Text with
EEA Relevance, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64; Directive 2013/11 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 21 May 2013 on Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes and
Amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on Consumer
ADR), 2013 O.J. (L 165) 63; Regulation 524/2013, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 21 May 2013 on Online Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes and Amending
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR),
2013 O.J. (L 165) 1.
35.
See, e.g., Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General
Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
36.
Regulation 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 in Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1.
37.
Regulation 864/2007, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July
2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40–
49.
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One of the few modern instances of direct EU speech regulation is art.
17 GDPR, which enshrines the so-called “Right to be Forgotten,” based on
38
an earlier decision by the ECJ. Somewhere in between these two extremes
lies the ECD. It does not directly regulate online speech. Rather, it sets up a
comprehensive framework for electronic commerce, and is thus a corner39
stone of the establishment of the Digital Single Market. The ECD also
deals with liabilities and immunities of ISPs and the actions that can be taken against them. These actions, in turn, have an impact on online content.

B. In Particular: The E-Commerce Directive 2000/31
According to its art. 1(1), the ECD seeks to enhance the internal market
by guaranteeing the free movement of “information society services.” It focusses on the freedom of establishment of information society services (arts.
4 and 5 ECD), the rules for commercial communication (arts. 6–8 ECD),
electronic contracts (arts. 9–11 ECD), and the liabilities of service providers
(arts. 12–15 ECD), supplemented by rules for transposing and enforcing the
40
directive (arts. 16–20 ECD).
In arts. 12–14, the ECD provides for three instances in which ISPs are
not liable for illegal content their service encounters: specifically, when they
are caching, conduiting, and hosting content. Each article conditions this
immunity in certain ways, for example, immunity for content stored at the
request of a user under art. 14(1) is only available if:
“(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity
or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of
facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such
knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable
access to the information.”
However, these immunities explicitly do not shield the ISPs from injunctions requiring ISPs to terminate or prevent infringements, as arts.
12(3), 13(2), and 14(3) ECD state. Art. 14(3) ECD further allows member
states to establish procedures governing the removal of illegal content by
the ISP. This means that the ISPs enjoy, under certain conditions, immunity
from liability for the illegal content on their service but are not exempted
from being obligated under national law to remove content identified as illegal. This stands in contrast to the broad immunity enjoyed by ISPs under
47 U.S.C. § 230, which grants them immunity from any cause of action

38.
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶ 34 (May 13, 2014).
39.
See ECD, supra note 5, recitals 1–4, art. 1(1).
40.
UTE WELLBROCK, EIN KOHÄRENTER RECHTSRAHMEN FÜR DEN ELEKTRONISCHEN
GESCHÄFTSVERKEHR IN EUROPA 30-37 (2005).
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treating them as a “publisher” or “speaker” of the content on their service.
As a limitation to the obligations of ISPs, art. 15 ECD makes clear that there
is no general obligation for ISPs to monitor content.
While these provisions can easily come into play in a case regarding
online content regulation, they are strictly ancillary to the illegality of content. The ECD itself does not at all define or regulate what illegal content is.
Under the relevant section, the ECD is only concerned with liabilities and
obligations for ISPs arising from illegal content.

III. Making Sense of GLAWISCHNIG-PIESCZEK
A. A Focus on the Protection of Interests Harmed by Illegal Content
The ECJ had previously established that arts. 12–15 ECD are protec42
tions for ISPs designed to recognize their special role as intermediaries.
While art. 15 ECD prohibits general obligations to monitor, recital 45 ECD
allows monitoring obligations “in a specific case.” Thus, the difficulty is to
determine what kind of monitoring obligations are specific and what kind of
obligations are general in nature.

1. Uncertainties Surrounding art. 15 ECD Before Glawischnig-Piesczek
In two previous cases, Scarlett Extended and SABAM, the ECJ had the
opportunity to address whether a filtering regime imposed by national law
43
was a prohibited general obligation to monitor. In these cases, three characteristics of the filtering regimes at issue made them problematic for the
ECJ under art. 15 ECD: (1) active observation of (2) all files stored or all
communication transmitted, resulting in (3) an observation of all or almost
44
all of the information transmitted or stored by all users of the service. The
ECJ declined to formulate a general test in this regard, but concluded that
the combination of these three factors went too far.
41.
See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49–50 (D.D.C. 1998). More recent examples include Jones v. Dirty
World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 416 (6th Cir. 2016); O’Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc.,
831 F.3d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 2016); Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019); Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1269–71 (D.C. Cir. 2019);
Madeline Byrd & Katherine J. Strandburg, CDA 230 for a Smart Internet, 88 FORDHAM L.
REV. 405, 408–11 (2019). For a constructive approach to the future of Sec. 230, see Andrew
O. Bolson, Flawed but Fixable: Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act at 20, 42
RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 1, 11–17 (2016).
42.
Joined Cases C-236 to 238/08, Google Fr. SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2010
E.C.R. I-2417, ¶ 107; Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 107.
43.
Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, ¶¶ 37–40;
Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, ¶¶ 36–38 (Feb. 16, 2012).
44.
Scarlet Extended SA, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, ¶ 39; SABAM, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, ¶
37.
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Complementary to these three cumulative factors, arts. 14 and 15 ECD
read in conjunction seem to provide the outer limit of what kind of obligation to monitor could still be tolerable under art 15 ECD. As Advocate General (AG) Szpunar argues, a broad interpretation of permissible obligations
under art. 15 ECD may carry the risk that ISPs no longer qualify for immun45
ities under art. 14(1) ECD. The broader the monitoring obligation, the
more likely it is for ISPs to have sufficient “actual knowledge” of illegal activity, which would strip them of their immunity under art. 14(1)(a) unless
they immediately act to remove the content under 14(2)(b). Art. 14(3) ECD
allows national authorities, notwithstanding the immunities of art. 14(1)
ECD, to require ISPs to terminate or prevent infringements or to establish
procedures governing the removal of content, thus presupposing the existence of the immunity. When read in conjunction, art. 15(1) ECD and art.
14(3) ECD do not seem to permit measures that would strip ISPs of their
immunities under art. 14(1) ECD. Thus, the outer limit of general monitoring obligations seems to be that injunctions may not force ISPs to lose their
46
immunity under arts. 14(1)(a) or (b) ECD.
The ECJ has not yet developed a definition of what constitutes a specific obligation. But even before Glawischnig-Piesczek, there were some hints
47
in the Directive and the case-law. As an initial matter, both arts. 14(3) and
48
18 ECD clearly allow Member States to impose obligations on ISPs for the
future, which means that a monitoring obligation does not automatically be49
come general in nature just because it is directed into the future. Further, in
50
a trademark case under the Intellectual Property Directive (L’Oréal v.
51
eBay ), the ECJ found permissible an obligation to prevent further “infringements of that kind” committed by the same seller with regard to the
52
same trademarks. The limits of this concept remain rather imprecise, but it
seems like the ECJ is sympathetic to actions against further infringements
that share all characteristics of the initial infringement. AG Szpunar argued

45.
Case
C-18/18,
Glawischnig-Piesczek
v.
Facebook
Ireland
Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶¶ 36–38 (June 19, 2019) (Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar).
46.
Id. ¶¶ 39–40.
47.
ECD, supra note 5, art. 14(3) (“This Article shall not affect the possibility for a
court or administrative authority . . . of requiring the service provider to . . . prevent an infringement.”).
48.
Id. art. 18 (“Member States shall ensure that court actions available under national
law . . . allow for the rapid adoption of measures . . . designed to . . . prevent any further impairment of the interests involved.”).
49.
ELONORA ROSATI, COPYRIGHT AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 158 (2019).
50.
See generally Directive 2004/48/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 29 April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 45.
51.
Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 139 (July 12,
2011).
52.
Id. ¶ 141.

Fall 2020]

Regulation of Online Speech

179

53

that this judgment was of a “cross-cutting nature” so that a monitoring obligation is specific if it extends to the same kind of infringement of the same
54
rights by the same user as originally at issue.
Another suggested benchmark for what constitutes a specific monitor55
ing obligation is its limited duration. This idea originated from the opinion
of AG Jääskinen in the L’Oréal case, where a time limitation was used to
56
ensure proportionality of the injunction in question. However, this is unconvincing. While proportionality of a monitoring obligation is important as
57
a general principle of EU law, it is not at all obvious that time limitations
are able to make a monitoring obligation specific, because the distinction
between general and specific obligations depends more on a substantive assessment than on a temporal limitation. A time limitation alone does little to
make obligations more specific and less general, but merely suspends the
obligation after a certain time.
In sum, significant uncertainty surrounded art. 15 ECD and its notions
of general and specific obligations to monitor. It was unclear whether it
mattered that the content was defamatory and therefore illegal and not a
trademark or copyright law violation. In this situation, the ECJ opted for a
strong protection of the interests harmed by defamatory content, a general
orientation that influenced many key findings of the judgment.

2. Specific Monitoring Obligations—A Broad but Controllable Notion
58

As AG Szpunar observed, the obligation to remove content identical
or equivalent to illegal content means that all user content on the platform is
subject to monitoring. Contrary to one possible reading of Scarlett Extended
and SABAM, the ECJ did not treat the scope of the data to be monitored as
decisive in determining whether a monitoring obligation is specific or general. Instead, the ECJ in Glawischnig-Piesczek found that a monitoring obligation is still specific if the monitoring of all content is focused on specific
illegal content that has been defined by a court and its different reincarna-

53.
Case
C-18/18,
Glawischnig-Piesczek
v.
Facebook
Ireland
Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶ 43 (June 19, 2019) (Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar).
54.
See id. ¶¶ 42–45; Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶¶
139, 141, 144.
55.
Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶¶ 47, 49 (Opinion of Advocate
General Szpunar); Case C-484/14, McFadden v. Sony Music Ent. Ger. GmbH,
EULI:EU:C:2016:170, ¶ 132 (Mar. 16, 2016) (Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar).
56.
Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6019, ¶ 181 (Opinion
of Advocate General Jääskinen).
57.
Proportionality is accepted as a general principle of EU law since the founding
days. See Case 8/55, Fédération Charbonnière v. High Auth. of the Eur. Coal and Steel Cmty.,
1956 E.C.R. 293, 299; see generally NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW 115–70 (1996).
58.
Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶ 59 (Opinion of Advocate General
Szpunar).
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tions on the service. It is thus the scope of the material inquiry that defines
whether a monitoring obligation is general or specific. A broad obligation to
monitor all content for any illegality is general but monitoring all content
for particular instances of illegal content is specific. This clearly resembles
59
the holding in L’Oréal and confirms the idea that once illegal content is
identified and defined by a Court, the ISP can be asked to remove, or block
content tainted by this kind of illegality.
It may seem counterintuitive to call a monitoring obligation of all content stored on a platform “specific;” however, such an obligation is targeted
60
and specifically limited to the grounds for illegality at issue. To prohibit
this as a general obligation would render the protection of the rights of the
defamed completely futile beyond the case in which the illegality of the
content was established. It is this focus on the effective protection of the interest harmed by defamatory content that runs through the entire judgment.
Importantly, this kind of specific monitoring obligation does not strip
the ISP of its immunity under art. 14(1) ECD, thus clearly respecting the
61
outer limits of specific monitoring obligations. To focus on one particular
kind of content when sifting through the traffic can hardly lead to sufficient
knowledge of illegal content to qualify for the loss of immunity because of
“actual knowledge of illegal activity or information” under art. 14(1)(a)
62
ECD. The use of “automated search tools and technologies” also does not
63
impact the immunities granted by the ECD.

3. Recognizing the Dangers of Social Networks
Another important aspect of the ECJ’s focus on the protection of the interests harmed by the illegal content is the reliance on the specific nature of
64
social networks and their dangers for personality rights. For the ECJ, the
nature of social networks and the risk of swift reproduction of illegal content justifies particular vigilance for the interests of the defamed user. This

59.
Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 141 (“[I]f the operator of the online marketplace does not decide . . . to prevent further infringements of that
kind by the same seller in respect of the same trademarks, it may be ordered, by means of
an injunction, to do so.”) (emphasis added).
60.
See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 37, 40, 41, 45.
61.
See Daphne Keller, Dolphins in the Net: Internet Content Filters and the Advocate
General’s Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Opinion, STANFORD CTR. FOR
INTERNET & SOC’Y (Sept. 4, 2019), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/Dolphins-in-the-NetAG-Analysis.pdf.
62.
Case
C-18/18,
Glawischnig-Piesczek
v.
Facebook
Ireland
Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 46.
63.
See Joined Cases C-236 to 238/08, Google Fr. SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier,
2010 E.C.R. I-2417, ¶¶ 114–117 (holding that the use of algorithms to organize and display
content did not impact immunity under art. 14 ECD).
64.
See Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 36.
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seems to be the reason why the ECJ allows the monitoring obligation irre65
spective of who uploaded the identical content.
In so allowing, the ECJ departs from the requirement in L’Oréal that
the future infringements to be prevented must not only be tainted by the
same illegality in respect of the same trademarks, but must also stem from
66
the same infringer. Indeed, such a limiting factor would clearly ignore how
social networks function and would overlook the specific dangers that the
dissemination of illegal speech on these network poses for the rights of the
person targeted by that speech. In defamation cases on social networks, this
specific vigilance is the consequence of an approach focused on protection
of the rights of the person damaged by the illegal content.

4. Defining Identical and Equivalent Content
The ECJ extends the possible reach of injunctions against ISPs to content that is identical or equivalent to the content originally found to be illegal. The ECJ did not attempt to define what “identical content” means. It
did, however, provide a definition of “equivalent content” as “information
conveying a message the content of which remains essentially unchanged
and therefore diverges very little from the content which gave rise to the
67
finding of illegality.”
It is crucial to understand that the rights of the defamed are not endangered by exact phrases. As the ECJ correctly points out, it is the defamatory
68
message conveyed that makes the statement at issue illegal. Accordingly,
it should be evident, as the ECJ points out, that the removal of equivalent
content is the best way to ensure effective termination of infringements and
69
further damages to the rights of the defamed.
Concerns were raised against the obligation to take down identical content, as that would likely mean a prohibition of the text ruled to be defamatory, resulting in the removal of these phrases even when they are not ille70
gal. The ECJ has also been criticized for not providing a sufficiently clear
71
definition of equivalent content. This is a valid criticism: the conceivable
appearances of a message with essentially unchanged content are numerous,
as are the contexts in which phrases can appear. How much can change for
the message to be “essentially unchanged”? Commentators have indicated

65.
See id. ¶ 37.
66.
Case C-324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 141.
67.
Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 39.
68.
Id. ¶ 40.
69.
Id. ¶ 41.
70.
Keller, supra note 61, at 20.
71.
Jennifer Daskal, Speech Across Borders, 105 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1625 (2019); Matthias C. Kettemann & Anna S. Tiedeke, Welche Regeln, welches Recht?: GlawischnigPiesczek und die Gefahren nationaler Jurisdiktionskonflikte im Internet, VERFASSUNGSBLOG
(Oct. 10, 2019), https://verfassungsblog.de/welche-regeln-welches-recht.
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that this poses many unsolvable questions for the ISPs, making the imple72
mentation of the judgment “close to impossible.”
A fair reading of the judgment, however, suggests that the treatment of
identical or equivalent content is not nearly as murky or burdensome on
ISPs as some might fear. The ECJ clearly is concerned with stopping the in73
fringement of rights and the further impairment of the protected interests.
The injunctions the ECJ permitted here are designed to stop some identified
illegality and its harms to the person concerned but do not go beyond this
goal.
This reading is why an obligation to take down “identical” content—as
long as it is truly that—should not be problematic, even for other users who
74
might want to use these phrases in other contexts. The ECJ allows national
courts to stop the same harm caused by the same means. Content is only
identical, and possibly the subject of an injunction, if it is not only an exact
reproduction of that content, but if it also produces the identical infringement of rights. Using the problematic phrases in jest, in news coverage, or
75
in academic writing is not “identical content.”
The determination of what content is “equivalent” similarly must hinge
on whether the content is illegal in the same way as the original content
was. Because it is the illegality that must be stopped, any kind of statement
that is tainted by the same features that made the original statement illegal
must be considered “equivalent.” Once a national court establishes what
makes the content at issue illegal, these considerations are the blueprint for
the determination of what may count as equivalent content.
This determination requires significant work for the national courts that
issue such injunctions. It is their job to clearly articulate what made the content at issue an illegal defamation. Insufficiencies in that regard may indeed
pose practical problems for ISPs. However, the ECJ is aware of that problem and indicates that the injunctions must contain the information that
turns content into equivalent content. The ECJ specifically asks national
courts to include in their injunctions “the name of the person concerned by
the infringement . . ., the circumstances in which that infringement was de76
termined and equivalent content to that which was declared to be illegal.”
It is thus primarily up to the national court issuing the injunction to define what qualifies as equivalent. The ISPs could benefit from this. Whatever content is not specifically identified as “equivalent content” in the injunction does not have to be treated as such. If national courts fail to adequately
indicate what content they had in mind, ISPs could point to the ECJ’s re72.
Daskal, supra note 71, at 1625.
73.
Case
C-18/18,
Glawischnig-Piesczek
v.
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 41 (Oct. 3, 2019).
74.
But cf. Keller, supra note 61, at 19.
75.
Id. at 19–20.
76.
Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 45.
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quirement for clarifications to avoid having to deal with equivalent con77
tent.
This responsibility of the national courts is not accidental. The ECD
hands over all responsibility for injunctions under art. 14(3) ECD to the national courts. And under art. 18(1) ECD, it is the member state’s obligation
to create effective remedies in their own courts to combat infringements.
Even if national courts did not live up to their responsibilities and ISPs
still wanted to comply, the ISPs would only have to refer to the reasons the
national court gave for why it found the original content to be illegal. As
soon as ISPs encounter any doubts in applying these standards, the content
under review automatically does not qualify as equivalent, because the
“[d]ifferences in the wording of that equivalent content . . . must not . . . be
such as to require the host provider concerned to carry out an independent
78
assessment of that content.” The ISPs will thus always have the benefit of
the doubt.

5. A Lopsided Protection of Interests?
The ECJ’s interpretation of art. 15 ECD may seem lopsided and unduly
focused on the interests harmed by illegal content without sufficient regard
for the interests of the users posting content and the interests of the ISP.
Leaving aside for the moment considerations based on fundamental rights
(see infra, C.III.), the ECJ’s judgment follows convincingly from the basic
legislative choices made in passing the ECD and offers a plausible and convincing reading of the ECD.
First, the only content the ECD is concerned with is illegal content.
Arts. 12–14 ECD deal with the immunities and obligations of ISPs in confrontation with illegal content and art. 15 ECD complements and limits
these obligations of ISPs. The ECD does not define the illegality but is
merely triggered by content found to be illegal under EU or national law
with due regard to the applicable fundamental rights guarantees. But whatever content has triggered the application of the ECD, is unprotected
speech. The interests of the speakers of this unprotected speech therefore do
not warrant any protection under the ECD. In the case at hand, the illegality
of the content at issue in the case had already been affirmatively established
by the Austrian Supreme Court under Austrian law and it was for the ECJ
only to decide on the interpretation of the ECD as triggered by this illegality.

77.
This construction allows the ECJ to bypass the problem of accountability for platforms if they must decide for themselves what kind of speech to censor. Kate Klonick, The
New Governors: The People, Rules and Processes in Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 1598, 1662-68 (2018).
78.
Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 45.
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Second, the ECJ balances the interests of ISPs with the interests harmed
79
by the content. The ECJ, in application of recital 41 ECD, achieves this, as
argued above, by handing over most of the responsibilities to the national
courts and requires them to come up with detailed instructions for the ISPs.
The possibility to rely on automated search tools is also considered as a factor that limits the burden on ISPs. Even if one may not agree with the result,
the interests of ISPs surely are considered by the ECJ.
Third, the ECD on its own terms shows special solicitude for the interests harmed by illegal content. Art. 18(1) puts member states under an obligation to “ensure that court actions available under national law concerning
information society services’ activities allow for the rapid adoption of
measures, including interim measures, designed to terminate any alleged infringement and to prevent any further impairment of the interests involved.”
(emphasis added).
With this article, the legislature indicated a very protective attitude towards the victims of infringements. The ECJ chose to interpret the limits the
ECD may place on injunctions with due regard to the ECD’s clear imperative to effectively protect the interests harmed. The ECJ thus took seriously
the legislative decision to allow national courts to effectively protect the interests harmed by illegal content. Any other general orientation would have
seriously misrepresented art. 18(1) ECD and would have turned the clearly
expressed legislative intentions upside down.
The ECJ’s focus, therefore, does not lose sight of important aspects, but
faithfully sticks to the ECD and the legislative decision to effectively protect against infringements through injunctions issued by national courts. If
that seems lopsided, it is mostly because the legislature conceived the ECD
the way it is now enforced by the ECJ.

B. The Problem of Automated Monitoring
One of the most discussed aspects of the judgment was that it apparently opened the door to upload filters that many object to on fundamental
80
rights grounds. On one reading of the judgment, some of the ECJ’s cryptic

79.
See id. ¶¶ 43–47.
80.
CJEU Ruling on Fighting Defamation Online Could Open the Door for Upload
Filters, EDRI (Oct. 3, 2019), https://edri.org/our-work/cjeu-ruling-on-fighting-defamationonline-could-open-the-door-for-upload-filters/#:~:text=a%20defamatory%20comment.,Some%20aspects%20of%20the%20decision%20could%20pose%20a%20threat%20for,filters
%20for%20all%20online%20content.; Eleftherios Chelioudakis, The Glawischnig-Piesczek v.
Facebook Case: Knock, Knock. Who’s There? Automated Filters Online, KU LEUVEN CITIP
(Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/blog/the-glawischnig-piesczek-vfacebook-case-knock-knock-whos-there-automated-filters-online.
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remarks could be understood as requiring the use of filters and excluding
81
human involvement to correct the mistakes filters make.
The use of automated filters to combat illegal content has been fiercely
82
debated, most recently in the context of the new Copyright Directive. Using filters as a means to counter hate speech is especially controversial because it is very doubtful, to say the least, whether filters will ever be able to
comprehend the subtleties in context that may differentiate defamation from
satire or the innocent use of a phrase from a use of that phrase that could be
83
hate speech. The legally mandated use of a technology that apparently
produces many false positives by blocking legal speech poses fundamental
rights problems. There is an abundance of instances in which the use of filters has produced undesirable results and they range from amusing and an84
85
noying to distressing.
However, a close reading of the case reveals that the ECJ’s remarks in
this regard are far less problematic than they may seem. Specifically, the
ECJ did not endorse or demand the use of filters uncontrolled by human
oversight.
The impression that the ECJ endorsed automated filter technologies
rests on two remarks in the judgment. First, the ECJ makes clear that the
ISPs cannot be ordered to undertake an independent assessment of the legality of the content. Second, the ECJ mentions automated search tools and
86
technologies to which the ISPs may have recourse.
To begin with, the ECJ does not simply state that ISPs may not undertake an assessment of a content’s illegality on their own. Rather, the ECJ
delimits its notion of “equivalent content” by introducing the idea that any
81.
This reading is advanced by some of the most vocal critics of the judgment. See,
e.g., Daphne Keller, Facebook Filters, Fundamental Rights, and the CJEU’s GlawischnigPiesczek Ruling, 69 GRUR INT’L 616, 620–22 (2020).
82.
Directive 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April
2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending Directives
96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92. For a critique, see Andrej Savin, Regulating
Internet Platforms in the EU – The Emergence of the ‘Level Playing Field’, 34 COMPUT. L. &
SEC. REV. 1215, 1225 (2018).
83.
See, e.g., Daskal, supra note 71, at 1625; Cindy Cohn, Bad Facts Make Bad Law:
How Platform Censorship Has Failed So Far and How to Ensure that the Response to NeoNazis Doesn’t Make It Worse, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 432, 437–50 (2008).
84.
Amber Ferguson, Proud Mom Orders ‘Summa Cum Laude’ Cake Online. Publix
Censors
It:
Summa . . .
Laude.,
WASH.
POST
(May
22,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/05/22/proud-mom-orderssumma-cum-laude-cake-online-publix-censors-it-to-summa-laude.
85.
Tracy Jan & Elizabeth Dwoskin, A White Man Called Her Kids the N-Word. Facebook Stopped Her from Sharing It., WASH. POST (June 31, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/for-facebook-erasing-hate-speechproves-a-daunting-challenge/2017/07/31/922d9bc6-6e3b-11e7-9c15177740635e83_story.html.
86.
Case
C-18/18,
Glawischnig-Piesczek
v.
Facebook
Ireland
Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶¶ 45–46 (Oct. 3, 2019).
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content that would require an independent assessment by the ISP does not
constitute equivalent content. Content that requires an autonomous decision
on its illegality by the ISP beyond the mechanical application of the national
court’s judgment, is not included in the ECJ’s notion of “equivalent con87
tent.” This is important because the prohibition of an independent assessment of content does not per se exclude human involvement in the review
process. Rather, it is a limiting factor in what the national court can ask the
ISP to deal with in an injunction. Specifically, the national court cannot ask
the ISP to look at content and force it to make up its own mind regarding
this content’s illegality. All the ISP can be asked to do is to mechanically
apply the clear parameters set out by the national court in the injunction.
Because of this limit of the ISP’s obligations, the ECJ points out that
they can more easily use “automated search tools and technologies” to comply with injunctions. For the ECJ, the possibility to use such technologies is
88
a factor in the balancing of the interests involved. The combination of a
narrow conception of “equivalent content” and the rising possibility of not
89
having to rely exclusively on human judgment to detect such content leads
the ECJ to conclude that such obligations are not an exceeding burden on
the ISPs. The ECJ focusses extensively on the narrow scope of the removal
obligation, which signals that a broader obligation that would have required
ISPs to make up their own minds as to the illegality of related content would
have been excessive. But the obligation is narrower. It explicitly excludes
autonomous judgment calls and facilitates the use of technologies in assisting the ISPs. The use of filters does not seem to be a requirement or necessity. The ECJ merely explains why in a situation where ISPs can resort to
technologies to aid in their tasks, this task is not burdensome enough considering the other interests involved to not allow for such an obligation.
Therefore, nothing in the judgment requires the use of broadly sweeping filters that cannot be corrected by human involvement. Nothing in the
judgment even indicates that the use of humans to monitor and correct the
work of filters would be problematic or an undue burden. This is because
the finding that the burden on the ISP is not too heavy rests on the fact that
ISPs do not have to make up their own minds as regards the illegality of
content—they can only be asked to mechanically apply the factors a national court identifies in an injunction. Because of that, the task may be facilitated by technologies.
It is true that the ECJ does not require human intervention to fix the
mistakes automated filters could make. ISPs may, as a result, choose to use
only filters to comply with such injunctions, preferring cheaper, blunt action
instead of fine-tuned precision. However, it is not the ECJ’s responsibility

87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. ¶¶ 43, 46.
Id. ¶ 46.
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to tailor to the needs of ISPs. Courts enforcing a law that aims to protect the
interests harmed by illegal content should not need to weaken the protection
of these interests just because those to which the law assigns the responsibility to prevent future harms might decide to use improper tools in their own
economic interest. The ECJ’s limited concept of equivalent content that
ISPs can be asked to take down with its significant burden on national
courts to define this content should aid the ISPs in not having to resort to
broadly sweeping filters.

C. The Curious Absence of Fundamental Rights
Even though the ECJ’s approach has been very protective of the
interests harmed by defamatory speech, more fundamental rights interests
are involved. One of the most prominent critiques of the judgment was that
it did not sufficiently deal with the fundamental rights issues raised by the
90
case. Indeed, the case raises many urgent fundamental rights questions,
perhaps most pressingly the question of what kind of speech online can be
banned and how the obligations of service providers to monitor and remove
content affects fundamental rights of both the ISP and the users. It is true
that the ECJ does not consider these points in the judgment and merely
alludes to the necessity to ensure a balance between the burdens placed on a
service provider and the person who was the subject of the defamatory
91
content. Neither the CFR, nor national fundamental rights, nor the
92
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) are even mentioned in
the judgment.
Is the ECJ willfully ignoring obvious fundamental rights problems or
was there simply no majority within the ECJ for any view on these issues?
A thorough analysis of the case, the principles guiding the applicability of
the CFR, and the complicated interplay of fundamental rights guaranteed by
national law, EU law and the ECHR suggests a more balanced view. While
the ECJ’s silence on these matters may be highly frustrating from an academic point of view, there are good reasons why the ECJ did not engage in
such an analysis. The case simply did not trigger the CFR’s guarantees of
free speech and freedom of information. Instead, these questions, for now,
must be handled under national fundamental rights guarantees and the
ECHR. Only the freedom to conduct a business under art. 16 CFR may have
a role to play here.

90.
See, e.g., Kettemann & Tiedeke, supra note 71.
91.
See Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶¶ 43, 46.
92.
Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950 [hereinafter ECHR].
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1. Fundamental Rights Interests Involved
There are multiple fundamental rights interests involved in this case
which are, in abstracto, all recognized by the CFR. Art. 11 CFR protects the
freedom of expression of the user who posted the initial content, the user
who posts identical and equivalent content, and other users to receive information. This right is subject to the limit of a proportionate restriction for
93
the protection of the reputation and rights of others. The removal order
may also implicate Facebook Ireland’s rights to conduct a business under
art. 16 CFR. For the following reasons, however, most of these Charter
rights were not applicable to the case and the ECJ was correct in not implicating them in its analysis.

2. Standard for the Applicability of the CFR
Art. 51(1) CFR governs the applicability of the CFR. It reads:
The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are
implementing Union law.
While there is significant debate and still much uncertainty surrounding
94
this provision, the caselaw of the ECJ allows one to formulate some general tests to determine the Charter’s applicability, workable enough to determine whether the CFR should have played a role in the case at hand.

a. Applicability of the Charter in “The Scope of EU Law”
The wording of art. 51(1) CFR was inspired by certain parts of the
95
ECJ’s pre-Charter caselaw which concerned situations in which EU law
96
required a member state to act. In other pre-Charter cases, in which Mem-

93.
This limit is expressly recognized in art. 10(2) ECHR, which applies by virtue of
art. 52(3) CFR to the interferences with fundamental rights that the Charter allows under art.
52(1) CFR.
94.
For an overview of the many uncertainties surrounding this provision, see Filippo
Fontanelli, The Implementation of European Union Law by Member States Under Art. 51 (1)
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 20 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 193, 234–43 (2014); Daniel
Sarmiento, Who’s Afraid of the Charter: The Court of Justice, National Courts and the New
Framework of Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1267,
1272–87 (2013).
95.
Case 5/88, Wachauf v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 1989 E.C.R. 2609, ¶ 19; Case C2/92, The Queen v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries and Food ex parte Bostock, 1994 E.C.R. I955, ¶ 16; Case C-292/97, Karlsson, 2000 E.C.R. I-2737, ¶ 27.
96.
These situations also encompass situations in which member states enjoy a discretionary power, which has to be exercised in accordance with other EU law provisions. See,
e.g., Joined Cases C-411 & 493/10, N.S. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 2011 E.C.R. I13905, ¶ 65.
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ber States had derogated from EU law or in which EU fundamental rights
were found to be inapplicable, the ECJ stated that Member States are bound
by EU fundamental rights in areas which “fall within the scope of EU
97
98
law.” This restrictive phrase finally adopted by the Charter was taken out
of its context as a formulation to describe one category of EU fundamental
rights application prior to the elaboration of a written catalogue of funda99
100
mental rights in the EU. The official explanations relating to the Charter,
101
which serve as a basis for the CFR’s interpretation, openly contradicted a
limited understanding of the CFR’s applicability by asserting that Member
States are bound by the CFR when “they act in the scope of [EU] law.”
Considering these developments, the ECJ in the case of Åkerberg
102
Fransson did not accept a role for the Charter that was limited to situations in which member states acted according to obligations imposed by EU
law. The ECJ held that “the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter
must . . . be complied with where national legislation falls within the scope
103
of European Union law.” This meant that “situations cannot exist which
are covered in that way by European Union law without those fundamental
rights being applicable. The applicability of European Union law entails ap104
plicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.” Given
the CFR’s history, such a broad interpretation of art. 51 CFR could hardly
105
have come as a surprise.
97.
See Case C-260/89, Etairia v. Pliroforissis, 1991 E.C.R. I-2925, ¶ 42; Case C299/95, Kremzow v. Republik Österreich, 1997 E.C.R. I-2629, ¶¶ 15–17; Case C-309/96, Annibaldi v. Sindaco del Comune di Guidonia, 1997 E.C.R. I-7493, ¶¶ 10, 14.
98.
See GUY BRAIBANT, LA CHARTE DES DROIT FONDAMENTAUX DE L’UNION
EUROPEENNE: TEMOIGNAGE ET COMMENTAIRES 251 (2001); Peter Goldsmith, A Charter of
Rights, Freedoms, and Principles, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REV., 1201, 1204-05 (2001).
99.
Fabrice Picod, Art. 51 – Champ d’Application, in CHARTE DES DROITS
FONDAMENTAUX DE L’UNION EUROPEENNE: COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE ¶ 22 (Fabrice Picod & Sébastien van Drooghenbroeck eds., 2017).
100.
Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, O.J. (C 303) 17.
101.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
6, Dec. 13, 2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1 (“The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter
shall be interpreted . . . with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set
out the sources of those provisions.”); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
art. 52(7), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391 (“The explanations drawn up as a way of
providing guidance in the interpretation of this Charter shall be given due regard by the courts
of the Union and of the Member States.”); see also Case C-279/09, Deutsche Energiehandelsund Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2010 E.C.R. I-13849, ¶ 32.
102.
Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v. Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105 (Feb. 26, 2013).
103.
Id. ¶ 21.
104.
Id.
105.
Bernhard Schima, EU Fundamental Rights and Member State Action After Lisbon:
Putting the ECJ’s Case Law in Its Context, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1097, 1107 (2015). Such
an understanding had already clearly been on the rise by that time. See, e.g., Piet Eeckhout,
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
945, 993 (2002); Thomas von Danwitz & Katherina Paraschas, A Fresh Start for the Charter:
Fundamental Questions on the Application of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights,
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The ECJ thus established the formula of the “scope of EU law” as the
governing approach to the interpretation of art. 51 CFR. Apart from some
106
hints, the ECJ, however, did not set a standard for the determination of the
107
“scope of EU law.”

b. Test: “A Degree of Connection”
108

After heavy criticism, the ECJ tried to explain how the applicability
of the CFR in cases beyond the implementation of EU law may be deter109
mined. After all, the CFR is only a bill of rights specifically for EU law
and not, contrary to the ECHR, a minimum standard for human rights in all
of Europe. It presupposes the applicability of EU law to a case. Accordingly, the CFR’s applicability depends on “a certain degree of connection
above and beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those
110
matters having an indirect impact on the other.”

35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1396, 1406 (2012); Koen Lenaerts, Exploring the Limits of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights, 8 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 375, 385 (2012); Case C-108/10,
Scattolon v. Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca, 2011 E.C.R. I-7491, ¶¶
118–19. The inclusion of the Wachauf situation within art. 51 CFR had arguably already been
endorsed by the ECJ in Case C-145/09, Baden-Württemberg v. Tsakouridis, 2010 E.C.R. I11979, ¶ 52.
106.
See Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, ¶¶ 24–30; Schima, supra note 105, at 1108.
107.
See Emily Hancox, The Meaning of Implementing EU Law under Article 51 (1) of
the Charter: Akerberg Fransson, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1411, 1423 (2013). PostFransson orders with inconsistent reasoning that declined the application of the CFR also did
not shed much light on the ECJ’s stance. The ECJ declined application of the Charter in Case
C-457/09, Chartry v. État belge, 2011 E.C.R. I-819, ¶ 25, and Case C-339/10, Estov v. Ministerski savet na Republika Bulgaria, 2010 E.C.R. I-11465, ¶ 14, for lack of a connection of the
case to EU law, but also formulated concern that the national measure in question did not implement EU law. See Case C-434/11, Corpul National al Politislor v. Ministerul Administraciei _i Internelor, 2011 E.C.R. I-196, ¶ 16; Case C-128/12, Sindicato dos Bancários do
Norte v. Banco Português de Negócios SA, ECLI:EU:C:2013:149, ¶ 12 (Mar. 7, 2013).
108.
See Fontanelli, supra note 94, at 216–17. The German Federal Constitutional Court
even saw the Fransson case as a possible threat to national sovereignty. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 24, 2013, 133 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 277, 313, ¶¶ 88–91 (Ger.).
109.
According to art. 6(1) TEU, “The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any
way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.”. To that effect, see Case
C-400/10, McB. v. L. E., 2010 E.C.R. I-8965, ¶ 51; Case C-256/11, Dereci v. Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2011 E.C.R. I-11315, ¶ 71; Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, ¶ 23; Case C483/12, Pelckmans Turnhout NV v. Walter Van Gastel Balen NV, ECLI:EU:C:2014:304, ¶ 21
(May 8, 2014); Lenaerts, supra note 105, at 377.
110.
Case C-206/13, Siragusa v. Sicilia, ECLI:EU:C:2014:126, ¶ 24 (Mar. 6, 2014). This
test has become part of the ECJ’s settled jurisprudence. See, e.g., Case C-198/13, Hernández
v. Reino de España, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2055, ¶ 34 (July 10, 2014); Case C-562/12, Liivimaa
Lihaveis MTÜ v. Eesti-Läti programmi 2007–2013 Seirekomitee, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2229, ¶
62 (Sept. 17, 2014); Case C-218/15, Paoletti v. Procura della Repubblica,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:748, ¶ 14 (Oct. 6, 2016); Joined Cases C-177 & 178/17, Sas v. Ministero
della Giustizia, ECLI:EU:C:2017:656, ¶ 19 (Sept. 7, 2017). The ECJ itself traces the formulation back to the pre-Charter Case C-299/95, Kremzow v. Republik Österreich, 1995 E.C.R. I-
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The ECJ later established a (non-exhaustive) list of factors to establish
such a connection: (1) whether the national legislation is intended to implement a provision of EU law; (2) the nature of the legislation at issue and
whether it pursues objectives other than those covered by EU law, even if it
is capable of indirectly affecting EU law; (3) whether there are specific rules
111
of EU law on the matter or rules which are capable of affecting it. The
ECJ also stressed the maintenance of previous case-law limiting the ap112
plicability of EU fundamental rights to member states. Notably, EU fundamental rights are not applicable to national measures if EU law does not
113
impose specific obligations on the Member States in this regard, if the national measure was not adopted within the framework of measures adopted
114
under EU law, and if the only connection of EU law to the measure in
115
question is the fact that the EU also possesses power in this area. Furthermore, the ECJ pointed out that EU fundamental rights protection is necessary when the application of different, varying fundamental rights would
116
undermine the unity, primacy, and effectiveness of EU law.
This analysis shows that the ECJ has chosen to undertake a case-by117
case analysis of the applicability of the CFR. The case-law of the ECJ oscillates between an expansive understanding of the CFR and the more limited requirement of a substantive link of a given case to EU law. But the
general sentiment in all the judgments is that the CFR is the “shadow of EU

2629, ¶ 16. A similar sentiment had, in a different context, already been expressed in Case
149/77, Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, 1978 E.C.R
1365, ¶¶ 29–33.
111.
Hernández, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2055, ¶ 37. This enumeration was introduced in Case
C-40/11, Iida v. Ulm, ECLI:EU:C:2012:691, ¶ 79 (Nov. 8, 2012), on citizenship, drawing inspiration from Case C-309/96, Annibaldi v. Sindaco del Comunedi Guidonia, 1997 E.C.R. I7493, ¶¶ 21–23. This approach was thought be have been overruled by Fransson. See Sarmiento, supra note 94, at 1276. However, later citizenship cases rejected this idea. See Case
C-87/12, Ymeraga v. Ministre du Travail, ECLI:EU:C:2013:291, ¶ 41 (May 8, 2013).
112.
Hernández, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2055, ¶¶ 35–36.
113.
Case 144/95, Ministère Public v. Maurin, 1996 E.C.R. I-2909, ¶¶ 11–12; Siragusa,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:126, ¶¶ 26–27.
114.
Case C-427/06, Bratsch v. Bosch und Siemens Haugeräte, 2008 E.C.R. I-7245, ¶
18; Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci v. Swedex, 2010 E.C.R. I-00365, ¶ 25; Case C-147/08, Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 2011 E.C.R. I-03591, ¶ 61.
115.
See, e.g., Joined Cases C-483/09 & 1/10, Gueye, 2011 E.C.R. I-08263, ¶¶ 55, 69,
70; Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, ¶¶ 104, 105, 180, 181 (Nov. 22,
2012).
116.
Siragusa, ECLI:EU:C:2014:126, ¶ 25. This is mirrored by the fact that the CFR
allows for the application of national standards within its scope of application, as long as unity, primacy, and effectiveness of EU law are respected. See Case C-399/11, Melloni v. Fiscal,
ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, ¶¶ 58–60 (Feb. 26, 2013).
117.
Schima, supra note 105, at 1123.
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118

law” and goes wherever EU law goes. With this in mind, the role for the
CFR in the Glawischnig-Pieszcek case was rather limited.

3. Application to the Case
As this note has argued, the fundamental rights questions raised by upload filters were not for the ECJ to decide. But there are other fundamental
rights issues that are related to the case. They are, however, not properly
dealt with under EU law. They must be dealt with under national law and
the ECHR.
At the outset, it is important to note that the scope of the ECJ’s review
was limited in two important ways. First, the Austrian Supreme Court had
only asked about situations in which content had already been identified as
illegal under domestic law. Second, the ECJ was only asked to decide
whether the ECD would stop the Austrian Supreme Court from ordering
what it would have ordered under national law. All other questions were ultra petita for the ECJ.
The nature of the preliminary reference procedure before the ECJ only
emphasizes these limits. It is the sole responsibility of the national courts to
determine the need for a preliminary ruling and the relevance of the questions referred to the ECJ and the ECJ is then bound to give a ruling on the
119
questions referred. The questions referred by a national court can significantly predetermine the perspective the ECJ has on a case.
More specifically, the ECJ can only interpret EU law, never national
120
121
law. The ECJ is able to narrow down a question and take into account
118.
Koen Lenaerts & José A. Gutiérrez-Fons, The Place of the Charter in the EU Constitutional Edifice, in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 1559,
1566–67 (Steve Peers et al. eds., 2014).
119.
For recent examples, see Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, ¶ 24 (June 16, 2015); Case C-304/16, Am. Express Co. v. The Lords
Comm’rs of Her Majesty’s Treasury, ECLI:EU:C:2018:66, ¶ 31 (Feb. 7, 2018); Case C621/18, Wightman v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the Eur. Union, ECLI:EU:C:2018:999, ¶ 26
(Dec. 10, 2018).
120.
See, e.g., Case C-424/97, Haim v. Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein,
2000 E.C.R. I-5123, ¶¶ 55–56; Case C-19/00, SIAC Construction Ltd. v. Mayo Cnty. Council,
2001 E.C.R. I-7725, ¶ 30; Case C-390/99, Canal Satélite Digital v. Administración General
del Estado, 2002 E.C.R. I-607, ¶ 24; C-212/04, Adeneler v. Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos,
2006 E.C.R. I-6057, ¶ 103; Case C-328/04, Vajnai v. Hungary, 2005 E.C.R. I-8577, ¶ 13;
Case C-287/08, Crocefissa Savia v. Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca,
2008 E.C.R. I-136; Case C-345/09, Van Delft v. College voor Zorgverzekeringen, 2010
E.C.R. I-9879, ¶¶ 110–115; Case C-23/12, Zakaria v. Latvia, ECLI:EU:C:2013:24, ¶ 29 (Jan.
17, 2013).
121.
See, e.g., Case 83/78, Pigs Mktg. Bd. v. Redmond, 1978 E.C.R. 2347, ¶¶ 25–26;
Case 35/85, Procureur de la Republique v. Tissier, 1986 E.C.R. 1207, ¶¶ 5–11; Case C228/98, Dounias v. Ipourgos Ikonomikon, 2000 E.C.R. I-577, ¶ 36; Case C-560/15, Europa
Way Srl v. Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, ECLI:EU:C:2017:593, ¶¶ 35–36
(July 26, 2017); Case C-189/18, Glencore Agriculture Hungary Kft. v. Nemzeti Adó- és
Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága, ECLI:EU:C:2019:861, ¶ 31(Oct. 16, 2019).
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EU law provisions not referred to in the reference if their interpretation is
122
necessary to give a complete answer to the question. But the Court is often reticent to address problems other than those submitted by the national
123
court. The ECJ only breaks with this rule if these further issues were
clearly raised before the national court as a problem of EU law and if the
124
ECJ itself has been thoroughly briefed on the issue. Anyone who had
hoped for a sweeping clarification from the ECJ on all the delicate issues
concerning the regulation of online speech risked a serious disappointment.
This limitation means that the question is not whether there is some way
the ECJ could have dealt with the fundamental rights issues this case may
present. Rather, it must be asked whether these questions arise in this case
as a matter of interpretation of the ECD. They do not.

a. Declaring Defamatory Content Illegal
The question of which kind of online speech may be banned does not
fall under the ECD and thus not within the “scope of EU law” relevant for
this case. The ECD docks to the otherwise established illegality of content.
The interpretation of the ECD with which the ECJ was tasked in this case
does not involve determining the illegality of content. Rather, the illegality
of online content is a prerequisite for the involvement of the ECD, notably
for the immunities it grants and the injunctions it allows. Any fundamental
rights questions raised by declaring certain online content illegal are thus of
no interest to the ECD and, by extension, to the CFR.
To begin with, it should be noted that the EU lacks any consistent policy on Internet content regulation. EU law only offers sector specific provisions which, as far as speech is concerned, mostly deal with jurisdiction,
125
choice of law and the responsibilities of ISPs. The EU has not harmonized
126
substantive defamation law and it is doubtful that it could in a general

122.
See, e.g., Case C-387/01, Weigel v. Finanzlandesdirektion für Vorarlberg, 2004
E.C.R. I-4981, ¶ 44; Case C-275/06, Promusicae v. Telefónica de España SAU, 2008 E.C.R.
I-271, ¶¶ 42–46; Case C-341/08, Petersen v. Berufungsausschuss für Zahnärzte für den Bezirk
Westfalen-Lippe, 2010 E.C.R. I-47, ¶¶ 47–50; Case C-461/10, Bonnier Audio v. Perfect
Commc’n Swed., ECLI:EU:C:2012:219, ¶¶ 45–50 (Apr. 19, 2012); Case C-636/11, Berger v.
Freistaat Bayern, ECLI:EU:C:2013:227, ¶ 31 (Apr. 11, 2013). For recent examples, see Case
C-222/18, VIPA Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. v. Országos Gyógyszerészeti és Élelmezésegészségügyi Intézet, ECLI:EU:C:2019:751, ¶ 50 (June 12, 2019); Case C-671/18, Centraal
Justitieel Incassobureau v. Z. P., ECLI:EU:C:2019:1054, ¶ 26 (Dec. 5, 2019).
123.
See, e.g., Case C-338/89, Slagterier v. Landbrugsministeriet, 1991 E.C.R. I-2315, ¶
14; Case C-131/97, Carbonari v. Università degli Studi di Bologna, 1999 E.C.R. I-1103, ¶¶
48–53; Case C-311/08, SGI v. Etat Belge, 2010 E.C.R. I-487, ¶¶ 19–23.
124.
See Joined Cases C-95 & 96/07, Ecotrade v. Agenzia delle Entrate – Ufficio di Genova 3, 2008 E.C.R. I-3457, ¶¶ 35–38; Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm’r,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 67 (Oct. 6, 2015).
125.
SAVIN, supra note 26, at 130, 142.
126.
Id. at 130.
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127

manner. The ECD especially shows awareness for its limits, stressing in
recital 9 that “this Directive is not intended to affect national fundamental
rules and principles relating to freedom of expression.” This alone, of
course, does not exclude any interaction of the ECD with the freedom of
expression or the applicability of the CFR. But it shows that EU law is happily deferring to national guarantees of freedom of expression.
More specifically, this is demonstrated by how the relevant provisions
of the ECD function and how they interact with national law. In section 4,
the ECD sets up a common framework for ISPs in their confrontation with
illegal content but it nowhere defines what makes content illegal. Both the
ISP immunities (arts. 12–14 ECD) and the ban on general monitoring obligations (art. 15 ECD) are triggered by the existence of illegal content but the
ECD has no role in determining the content’s illegality. The ECD does not
reach the question of what content is illegal. And because the ECD does not
go into the questions of content illegality, the CFR also cannot go there as a
“shadow” of the ECD.
The illegality of content that triggers the ECD could result from national law, but it could also be a result of EU law. If certain EU legislation could
harmonize the standard for the illegality of certain content, this piece of EU
legislation would reach the determination of illegality and trigger the applicability of the CFR to deal with the fundamental rights issues arising
from this determination of illegality. However, the applicability of the CFR
would be triggered by EU law’s harmonization of standards for illegality,
not by the ECD.
There is, however, no legal standard resulting from EU law concerning
128
the illegality of defamatory content. The illegality of the content at issue
in Glawischnig-Piesczek resulted from Sec. 78 UrhG (Law on Copyright)
and Sec. 1330 (1) ABGB (General Civil Code), which, at least insofar as
they protect against defamatory speech, cannot be traced back to any EU
129
legislation. Sec. 78 UrhG, a copyright statute, is a prohibition on the dissemination of images harming the legitimate interests of a person. And Sec.

127.
Specific EU law provisions on content control do exist in Directive 2010/13/EU of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning
the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), O.J.
2010 (L 95) 1. But they are limited to specific issues that arise indirectly from the otherwise
regulated area. See SAVIN, supra note 26, at 142.
128.
SAVIN, supra note 26, at 130.
129.
Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] [Copyright Act], July 1, 1936, BGBL I at 1273 § 78
(1) (Ger). (“Images representing a person must neither be displayed publicly nor otherwise
publicly disseminated in another way, if this harms the legitimate interests of the person pictured . . .”) (translation provided by the author).
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130

1330(1) ABGB provides compensation for anyone who has suffered actual harm or loss of profit owing to an injury of their honor. The ECD docks
to those kinds of statutes without any substantive or formal link to them.
The substantive reasons for this illegality do not matter to the ECD, which
by design takes its cue from an external determination of illegality.
Different standards of the illegality of certain content are the default
setting under which the ECD operates. Accordingly, it seems strenuous at
best to construct a sufficient connection between the ECD and the national
norms that determine content illegality which would trigger the guarantees
of the CFR in the application of these national norms. In cases where a national norm merely triggers the ECD instead of another EU norm, EU law
simply is not concerned with the substantive determination of illegality. Because EU law does not reach these questions, the Charter cannot reach them
either.

b. Designing Injunctions
A little more delicate is the question whether the CFR should have
played a more prominent role in establishing what kind of injunctions art.
15 ECD and art. 18 ECD allow.
The ECD, despite granting immunities to ISPs in arts. 12–14, specifically allows for injunctions against the ISPs to terminate or prevent infringements in arts. 12(3), 13(2), and 14(3) ECD. Art. 18(1) ECD further
puts member states under an obligation to make measures available under
national law to terminate any infringement and protect against further infringements. Any injunction like the one issued by the Austrian Courts in
this case can be understood as a fulfillment of this obligation. As such, in
issuing injunctions, member states courts are effectively “implementing EU
law.” Because EU law governs these kinds of injunctions, the CFR “shadows” EU law in this respect. The CFR must thus generally be respected by
these injunctions. In determining what these injunctions may look like regarding the limits of the ECD, the ECJ must have due regard to the guarantees of the CFR. This requirement means that the question whether art. 15
ECD allows a national court to include identical or equivalent content in an
injunction must, as a general matter, comply with the CFR. Yet, things are
more complicated than this.
It must be noted, again, that the ECD fully defers to other sources of
law to define the infringements that injunctions can target. In the Glawischnig-Piesczek case, these happen to be national sources of law not subject
to the CFR. Even though the existence and the extent of the injunctions is
determined by EU law, the infringement which they are targeting is not de130.
Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [ABGB] [Civil Code], Jan. 1, 1917, § 1330
(Ger). (“If anyone has sustained actual harm or loss of profit through defamation, he is entitled to demand compensation.”) (translation provided by the author).
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termined by EU law. In this regard, the ECJ’s interpretation of art. 15 ECD
and the injunctions it allows only extends to content which shares in all respects all the relevant characteristics that led national courts to find the original content illegal. Any interests of the creator content and any interests of
another user who wishes to view this content are exactly the same interests
that were at play with regard to the initial content and were found to be uncompelling under national law.
This interpretation means that the fundamental rights interests involved
in the decision to extend the injunction to identical and equivalent content
are merely duplications of fundamental rights decisions made under national
law. All the identical or equivalent postings could individually be subject to
an injunction and the CFR would have absolutely no role in determining
whether these contents could be declared illegal and included in injunctions.
If the CFR got involved in determining whether the extension of the injunction to identical or equivalent content is possible, the CFR would be
able to prohibit the extension of one injunction to content which, as a matter
of EU law, could be subject to individual injunctions, even though the fundamental rights interests at issue do not differ at all. The CFR would have to
take issue with extending the injunction to content that by itself was also
perfectly suited to be included in an injunction. This means that when evaluated under the CFR, the determination of illegality and the balance of interests involved would have to come out differently than it would have under national law. To check the extension of injunctions to identical or
equivalent content for its compliance with the CFR thus also means to second-guess the national determination of illegality, which could not be questioned if it were made in individual injunctions.
To establish such a backdoor is extremely problematic, given the limits
of the CFR. EU defamation law is non-existent and EU law generally defers
to national law in these matters. In this particular situation, the design of the
injunction, which came within the scope of EU law, would force EU law to
determine the illegality of content, which EU law tends to fully avoid and
does not, as a matter of the ECD, have any business in. The material link of
the breadth of injunctions and the content’s illegality does not seem strong
enough to extend the CFR to these questions. It would therefore be an undue
intrusion of EU law into the reserved sphere of the member states if the
CFR were able to second guess fundamental rights determinations by the
member states through the backdoor of ECD injunctions.
Still, any other question regarding the design and impact of the injunctions, warrants the application of the CFR. For example, it could be debated
whether the ECJ should have considered the incentives broad injunctions set
for the over-policing content. The dangers of over-blocking are regularly
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recounted whenever ISPs are required by law to moderate content. But as
even the most ardent critics of measures allegedly leading to over-blocking
must admit, over-blocking is an economically driven reaction by the ISPs to
132
shield themselves against liability for under-blocking. It is far from clear
why the detriment to rights caused by an economic choice to over-enforce
rules that demand nothing but the elimination of illegal content should be
attributed to the state as an abridgment of fundamental rights. Because overblocking is not mandated by the laws and merely an economically motivated reaction by ISPs to deal with their removal obligations, the ISPs and not
the state or the laws are to blame for this phenomenon. Over-blocking concerns may be legitimate in a policy debate, but over-blocking is not a direct,
legally mandated consequence of these laws that should lead courts to underenforce removal obligations out of fear that companies might bluntly do
more than they are required to.

c. Fundamental Rights of ISPs
Unlike the speech related fundamental rights determinations, any other
aspect of the design and impact of the injunctions under the ECD is subject
to a review under the CFR. Most notably, this means that the right of the
ISP to conduct a business under art. 16 CFR is involved.
The case-law of the ECJ recognizes a limited scope of this right. Art. 16
CFR protects the freedom to exercise an economic activity, freedom of con133
tract, and free competition. It extends to the protection of business se134
crets and encompasses the right for any business to be able to freely use,
within the limits of its liability for its own acts, the economic, technical and

131.
Most statistical and anecdotal evidence comes from the experience with the DMCA
safe harbors. See, e.g., Jennifer Urban et al., Takedown in Two Worlds: An Empirical Analysis, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 483, 489, 514–20 (2018) (analyzing “288,675 notices containing
well over 100 million (108,331,663) individual takedown requests—i.e., claims of infringement.”).
132.
For a critique that the GDPR sets such incentives, see Daphne Keller, The Right
Tools: Europe’s Intermediary Liability Laws and the EU 2016 General Data Protection
Regulation, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 297, 332 (2018).
133.
Case C-134/15, Lidl GmbH & Co. v. Freistaat Sachsen, ECLI:EU:C:2016:498, ¶ 28
(June 30, 2016). The right to exercise economic or commercial activity dates back to cases
like Case 4/73 Nold v. Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., 1974 E.C.R. 491, ¶ 14, and Case 230/78,
SpA Eridiana v. Minister Agric. & Forestry, 1979 E.C.R. 2749, ¶¶ 20, 31. The right to freedom of contract had been recognized, inter alia, in cases such as Case 151/78, Nykøbing v.
Ministry of Agric., 1979 E.C.R. 1, ¶ 19, and Case C-240/97, Spain v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I6571, ¶ 99. Free competition is recognized by TFEU arts. 119 (1) and (3).
134.
Case C-1/11, Interseroh Scrap and Metals Trading GmbH v. Sonderabfall-Mgmt.Gesellschaft Rheinland-Pfalz mbH, ECLI:EU:C:2012:194, ¶ 43 (Mar. 29, 2012).
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135

financial resources available to it. However, the success rate of claims re136
lated to art. 16 CFR has been exceptionally low before the ECJ.
137
In contrast to Scarlet, in which the ECJ found the injunction at issue
to be a disproportionate limitation of art. 16 CFR, because the injunction did
138
not strike a fair balance of the interests involved, the ECJ did not undertake such a balancing test under art. 16 CFR in Glawischnig-Piesczek. But
139
the ECJ resorted to a balancing test inspired by recital 41 of the Directive,
finding that interpretation of art. 15 ECD struck a fair balance between the
140
different interests protected by the ECD. It is not obvious that conducting
this balancing test under art. 16 CFR would have changed the outcome of
the case.

d. The Role of the ECJ, National Law and the ECHR
Vigilance for fundamental rights protection is obviously very important.
141
Even though the ECJ has become a vigorous defender of Charter rights,
commentators should not give the ECJ an easy pass when fundamental
rights are not duly considered. However, as the foregoing considerations
have tried to show, applying the CFR can be a tricky business and a thorough analysis of its scope is often warranted.
For now, critics of the fundamental rights situation in the GlawischnigPiesczek case must turn to the guarantees of fundamental rights in the mem-

135.
Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:192, ¶ 49 (Mar. 27, 2014).
136.
Peter Oliver, What Purpose Does Article 16 of the Charter Serve?, in GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW AND EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 281 (Ulf Bernitz et al. eds. 2013).
137.
Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959.
138.
Id. ¶ 53.
139.
Recital 41 states: “This Directive strikes a balance between the different interests at
stake and establishes principles upon which industry agreements and standards can be based.”
140.
Case
C-18/18,
Glawischnig-Piesczek
v.
Facebook
Ireland
Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 46 (Oct. 3, 2019).
141.
For examples regarding arts. 7 and 8 CFR, see Joined Cases C-92 & 93/09 Schecke
v. Land Hessen, 2010 E.C.R. I-11063; Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights
Ireland v. Minister for Comms., Marine & Nat. Resources, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 (Apr. 8,
2014); Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (May 13, 2014); Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm’r,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6, 2015); Joined Cases C 203/15 & C 698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB
v. Post-och telestyrelsen, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970 (Dec. 21, 2016); Opinion 1/15, Transfer of
Passenger Name Record Data from the European Union to Canada, ECLI:EU:C:2017:592
(July 26, 2017); Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ireland,
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (July 16, 2020); Joined Cases C-511/18, C-512/18 & C-520/18, La
Quadrature du Net v. Premier ministre and Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone
v. Conseil des ministres, ECLI:EU:2020:791 (Oct. 6, 2020); Case C-623/17, Privacy Int’l v.
Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affs., ECLI:EU:C:2020:790 (Oct. 6, 2020).
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142

ber states and to the ECHR. In particular, Austria has had certain prob143
lems in the past in complying with art. 10 ECHR. It is the responsibility
of the Austrian courts and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to
ensure compliance with the ECHR. Any fundamental rights-based objections to the Glawischnig-Piesczek judgment could have been raised in those
venues, but it was not for the ECJ to ensure Austria’s compliance with the
ECHR. Instead, the ECJ left intact the delicate separation of responsibilities
created by the three layers of European fundamental rights protection.

D. Global Removal Orders: Respecting the Limits of EU Law
What makes Glawischnig-Piesczek so intriguing is that it does not only
deal with intricate questions of speech rights on the Internet and the regulation of ISPs but that it also ventures into the delicate jurisdictional questions
Internet governance poses. The Austrian Supreme Court also submitted a
question to the ECJ regarding the territorial scope of the injunctions it
planned to issue against Facebook and was seeking clarification on the limits EU law might set in this regard. The ECJ’s answer was as short and simple as it was compelling: not many.

1. A Bête Noire of Internet Regulation
Some commentators display an almost reflexive rejection of any kind of
144
Internet removal orders with extraterritorial reach. The emotions run high
in these matters and the fact that a coherent theory of jurisdiction in online
145
cases still has not been found adds to the difficulty of the discussion. The

142.
For a comprehensive study of the ECtHR’s case-law on the Freedom of Expression
of the Internet, see generally WOLFGANG BENEDEK & MATTHIAS C. KETTEMANN, LIBERTÉ
D’EXPRESSION ET INTERNET 23–54 (2013).
143.
See, e.g., Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82 (1986); Oberschlick v. Austria I,
App. No. 11662/85 (1991); Oberschlick v. Austria II, App. No. 10834/92 (1997); see generally Lukas Gahleitner, Wie meinen?, JURIDIKUM, 2019, at 123.
144.
Keller, supra note 61, at 35; Dan J. Svantesson, Grading AG Szpunar’s Opinion in
Case C-18/18 – A Caution Against Worldwide Content Blocking as Default, 13 MASARYK U.
J.L. & TECH. 389, 400 (2019) [hereinafter Svantesson, Grading AG Szpunar’s Opinion] (asserting that a “court with jurisdiction founded in EU law does not enjoy unfettered global jurisdiction just because it applies national law.”); Dan J. Svantesson, Bad News for the Internet
as Europe’s Top Court Opens the Door for Global Content Blocking Orders [Amended
Again], LINKEDIN (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/bad-news-internet-europestop-court-opens-door-global-svantesson [hereinafter Svantesson, Europe’s Top Court].
145.
Although, there are some preliminary works in this direction. For a list of works by
the Internet and Jurisdiction Policy Network, see generally INTERNET & JURISDICTION POL’Y
NETWORK, https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/work/content-jurisdiction (last visited Oct. 2,
2020).
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ECJ adds extremely little to this discussion by offering only five short para146
graphs.
The reasons supporting global removal orders in Internet cases rest
mostly on efficiency concerns in the light of the global nature of the Internet. This is illustrated by the Supreme Court of Canada’s holding in the case
of Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., an intellectual property case, in
147
which the court upheld a takedown order with worldwide effect. Critics
148
lament the inconsistency of such a possibility with comity. Others argue
that comity does not require an automatic deference to interests of other
states, but only to determine whether such interests exist and then to seri149
ously consider whether they are worth deferring to. Some called the
150
151
Equustek judgment “ominous,” “potentially quite dangerous,” and
warned that it could be abused by authoritarian regimes to globally delist
152
any unwelcome content from online search results. Its defenders point to
153
the carefully crafted limiting principles set out in the Equustek case. It is
also argued that enforceability of such global removal orders would, at least
in the United States, not be automatic, but could be denied if “the cause of
action . . . or the judgment itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the
154
United States . . . .” Beyond case specific debates, scholars are busy de-

146.
Case
C-18/18,
Glawischnig-Piesczek
v.
Facebook
Ireland
Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶¶ 48–52 (Oct. 3, 2019).
147.
Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824, ¶ 41 (Can.) (Abella,
J., writing for a 7-2 majority of the Court, aptly explained that “[t]he problem in this case is
occurring online and globally. The Internet has no borders—its natural habitat is global. The
only way to ensure that the interlocutory injunction attained its objective was to have it apply
where Google operates—globally.”)
148.
Complaint at 43, Google Inc. v. Equustek Sols., Inc., No. 5:17-cv-04207-NC (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 14, 2017), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206818.
149.
See Andrew K. Woods, Litigating Data Sovereignty, 128 YALE L.J. 328, 390
(2018).
150.
Daphne Keller, Ominous: Canadian Court Orders Google to Remove Search Results Globally, STAN. CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SOC’Y BLOG (June 28, 2017, 11:31 AM),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2017/06/ominous-canadian-court-orders-google-removesearch-results-globally.
151.
Eugene Volokh, ‘Canadian Court Orders Google to Remove Search Results Globally’, WASH. POST (June 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2017/06/29/canadian-court-orders-google-to-remove-search-results-globally.
152.
Michael Geist, Global Internet Takedown Orders Come to Canada: Supreme Court
Upholds International Removal of Google Search Results, MICHAEL GEIST (June 28, 2017),
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2017/06/global-internet-takedown-orders-come-canada-supremecourt-upholds-international-removal-google-search-results.
153.
Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824, ¶¶ 43–53 (Can.); Andrew K. Woods, No, the Canadian Supreme Court Did Not Ruin the Internet, LAWFARE (July
06, 2017, 2:25 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/no-canadian-supreme-court-did-not-ruinInternet.
154.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L. OF THE UNITED STATES § 482(2)(d)
(AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
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veloping general frameworks for these issues – proposing for example a re155
buttable presumption in favor of geographic segmentation.
EU law, for its part, knows only few instances of genuine extraterritori156
al application, mostly confined to financial regulations. EU legislation requiring the evaluation of foreign conduct or third country law while main157
taining a territorial connection with the EU is, on the other hand,
158
relatively common. A recent example includes art. 3 of the General Data
Protection Regulation, defining its territorial scope. This article can be understood as part of the EU’s mission to “uphold and promote its values and
interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens” in its relations with
159
the world, as art. 3(5) TEU provides. The case-law of the ECJ that affords
a robust protection of the data of EU citizens when they are transferred to
160
third-countries also fits into this narrative.
Nothing regarding these delicate questions appeared in GlawischnigPieszcek. Instead, the ECJ resorted to a technical answer, limited to the
question put before it.

2. Nothing to See Here: The ECD’s Silence on Global Removal Orders
All the ECJ has been asked to do was to clarify whether the ECD prohibits injunctions with worldwide effects. The ECJ finds that it does not,
pointing to art. 18(1) ECD and the ECD’s general lack of territorial limita161
tions when it comes to the reach of injunctions. As argued above, these
injunctions might come within the “scope of EU law” for the purposes of
the CFR. But neither the ECD nor the CFR contain any clear limits with regards to the territorial scope of the injunctions. And even some of the Courts
162
harshest critics agree that the ECJ got it right in this regard. Even if the

l’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1215 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam); Woods, supra
note 149, at 391–93.
155.
Daskal, supra note 71, at 1651.
156.
Joanne Scott, The Global Reach of EU Law, in EU LAW BEYOND EU BORDERS:
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF EU LAW 21, 24 (Marisa Cremona & Joanne Scott eds.,
2019).
157.
For this distinction between ‘extraterritoriality’ and ‘territorial extension’, see Joanne Scott, Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 87,
90 (2014).
158.
Scott, supra note 156, at 24.
159.
See generally Christopher Kuner, The Internet and the Global Reach of EU law, in
EU LAW BEYOND EU BORDERS: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF EU LAW 112 (Marisa
Cremona & Joanne Scott eds., 2019).
160.
See, e.g., Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm’r,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6, 2015); Opinion 1/15, Accord PNR EU-Canada,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:592 (July 26, 2017); Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (July 16, 2020).
161.
Case
C-18/18,
Glawischnig-Piesczek
v.
Facebook
Ireland
Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶¶ 48–49 (Oct. 3, 2019).
162.
See, e.g., Kettemann & Tiedke, supra note 71; Keller, supra note 61, at 36.
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Austrian Courts were not the proper venue for this specific case, as Face163
book, the Latvian, and the Finish governments had argued before the ECJ,
this would still be true, because art. 35 of the recast Brussels I Regulation
places the responsibility for injunctions firmly in the hands of national
courts under their own national law, even if courts of another member state
164
have jurisdiction over the subject matter. The applicable EU law thus puts
national courts in charge in this regard. Limits of their discretion to determine the appropriate territorial scope deriving directly from EU law are not
evident.
The ECJ, however, was aware of the intricate questions that are raised
by global removal orders. It showed itself cognizant of the limits created by
165
comity and made clear that, as a matter of EU law, the determination on
whether an injunction with worldwide effect is issued must be made in ac166
cordance with the applicable rules of international law. The ECJ derives
this one limit from recitals 58 and 60 of the ECD, which express the wish of
167
the EU legislator to keep EU law in accordance with international law.
This simple reference to international law as a whole grossly oversimplifies
the actual problems and is far from precise, but the applicable law is also far
from precise. EU law has nothing more to offer on these questions and the
ECJ declined to artfully invent any standards that lack any grounding in the
applicable EU law. Arguably, the ECJ even manifestly lacks jurisdiction to
make any further clarifications on these unresolved questions of International law.
Any other course of action would have led the ECJ to set a standard in a
highly contentious issue of International law on which the ECJ was neither
asked to rule nor had any jurisdiction to rule on. It is an odd position to unironically demand that the ECJ prevent national courts from issuing injunc168
tions they are allegedly not allowed to issue, by giving a ruling on things
it was not asked to and could not rule on due to a lack of jurisdiction. Before
the ECJ, this case was never about all the intricate questions of jurisdiction
163.
Case
C-18/18,
Glawischnig-Piesczek
v.
Facebook
Ireland
Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶ 86 (June 19, 2019) (Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar) (¶¶ 82–
86 also explain why the Austrian courts did have jurisdiction over the case).
164.
2012 O.J. (L 351) 13 (“Application may be made to the courts of a Member State
for such provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under the law of that
Member State, even if the courts of another Member State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.”).
165.
Keller, supra note 61, at 38 (urging the Court to do so).
166.
Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶ 51.
167.
Id. ¶ 3 (recital 58 ECD reads in relevant part: “in view of the global dimension of
electronic commerce, it is, however, appropriate to ensure that the Community rules are consistent with international rules”; recital 60 ECD reads in relevant part: “In order to allow the
unhampered development of electronic commerce, the legal framework must be . . . consistent
with the rules applicable at international level so that it does not adversely affect the competitiveness of European industry or impede innovation in that sector.”).
168.
See Svantesson, Europe’s Top Court, supra note 144.
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and comity. It was about what the ECD can contribute to this debate, which
is very little. These battles will have to be fought in front of national courts
contemplating global injunctions. These national courts, as the example of a
169
Belgian Court of Appeals shows, should be presumed to be more than
able to live up to this task.

3. Comparing Glawischnig-Piesczek to Google v. CNIL
A judgment the ECJ delivered merely nine days before Glawischnig170
Piesczek may have contributed to the confusion. In Google LLC v. CNIL,
the ECJ had ruled that the obligations for search engines under the so-called
171
“Right to be Forgotten” are limited to de-referencing search items on the
versions of search engines corresponding to EU member states and do not
extend to every globally available version of that search engine. The ECJ
has been praised for its restraint in this case, which some declared to be a
172
victory for Google. How does Glawischnig-Piesczek fit into this?
It is important to note the fundamentally different settings of the two
cases. Google v. CNIL involved the question whether EU law requires global de-referencing. In Glawischnig-Piesczek, the ECJ was asked to clarify
whether EU law prohibited a global removal order. On the latter question,
the two judgments are remarkably similar. All the ECJ decided (and was
asked to decide) in Glawischnig-Piesczek was that art. 15 ECD does not

169.
See Geert van Calster, Brussels Court of Appeal Rejects Jurisdiction Against Facebook Inc, Facebook Ireland in Privacy, Data Protection Case, GAVC LAW BLOG (JUNE 19,
2019), https://gavclaw.com/2019/06/19/brussels-court-of-appeal-rejects-jurisdiction-againstfacebook-inc-facebook-ireland-in-privacy-data-protection-case/ (reporting on a case in which
the Brussels Court of Appeals held that it had no jurisdiction over Facebook Ireland or Facebook, Inc.).
170.
See Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et des
libertés (CNIL), ECLI :EU:C:2019:772 (Sept. 24, 2019).
171.
Derived from arts. 12(b) and 14(1)(a) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 by the ECJ in Case C-131/12, Google Spain
SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (May 13, 2014), and
since explicitly enshrined in art. 17 GDPR. For the many scholarly contributions concerning
the judgment and its broader implications, see, e.g., Robert L. Bolton III, The Right to Be
Forgotten: Forced Amnesia in the Digital Age, 31 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIV. L.
133, 136 (2014); Chelsea E. Carbone, To Be or Not to Be Forgotten: Balancing the Right to
Know with the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 525, 533
(2015); Ignacio Cofone, Google v. Spain: A Right to Be Forgotten?, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 1 (2015); Aidan Forde, Implications of the Right to Be Forgotten, 18 TUL. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 83 (2015); PAUL LAMBERT, THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN –
INTERPRETATION AND PRACTICE (2019); Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the Right to Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67
DUKE L.J. 981 (2018).
172.
Sarah Marsh, Right to Be Forgotten on Google Only Applies in EU, Court Rules,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/sep/24/victoryfor-google-in-landmark-right-to-be-forgotten-case.
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stop a member state court from issuing global removal orders. Google v.
174
CNIL holds explicitly that, even though EU law currently does not require
global de-referencing, EU law does not prohibit this and leaves it up to the
national data protection authorities to decide under national fundamental
175
rights standards on such global de-referencing. To find these judgments to
176
be inconsistent , one must ignore how openly the ECJ in Google v. CNIL
177
endorsed national Internet regulation with extraterritorial effect. The
Google v. CNIL judgment is far from a victory for Google and others who
178
argue against extraterritorial Internet regulation in the EU.
There are many good reasons to think that the ECJ should have decided
in favor of a global applicability of the Right to be Forgotten in Google v.
CNIL. However, it is important to note that Google v. CNIL did not have to
come out the way it did for Glawischnig-Piesczek to make sense. Neither
case expounded a general theory of the extraterritoriality of European Internet regulation. Both cases are clearly limited to their respective legal
frameworks, the GDPR and the ECD. Having found that art. 17 GDPR does
not require global de-referencing does not prejudice whether art. 15 ECD
allows national courts to issue global removal orders for illegal content.
Contrary to the GDPR, art. 15 ECD harmonizes only specific aspects and
art. 18 ECD leaves national courts a broad discretion in remedying rights
violations. Nothing in the ECD sets any limits for national courts to issue
179
such takedown orders. The Court simply held as much.

173.
Case
C-18/18,
Glawischnig-Piesczek
v.
Facebook
Ireland
Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 50 (Oct. 3, 2019).
174.
The ECJ also clearly affirms that the EU legislator could have enacted a global
right to be forgotten. See Google LLC, ECLI :EU:C:2019:772, ¶ 58 (“Such considerations
[concerning the global nature of the Internet and the effects this has on the rights of Union
citizens] are such as to justify the existence of a competence on the part of the EU legislature
to lay down the obligation, for a search engine operator, to carry out, when granting a request
for de-referencing made by such a person, a de-referencing on all the versions of its search
engine.”).
175.
Id. ¶ 72.
176.
See, e.g., Cathryn Hopkins, Territorial Scope in Recent CJEU Cases: Google v.
CNIL
/
Glawischnig-Piesczek
v.
Facebook,
INFORRM
(Nov.
9,
2019),
https://inforrm.org/2019/11/09/territorial-scope-in-recent-cjeu-cases-google-v-cnilglawischnig-piesczek-v-facebook-cathryn-hopkins.
177.
Andrew K. Woods, Three Things to Remember from Europe’s ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Decisions, LAWFARE (Oct.1, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/three-thingsremember-europes-right-be-forgotten-decisions.
178.
Mary Samonte, Google v. CNIL: The Territorial Scope of the Right to Be Forgotten Under EU Law, 4 EUR. PAPERS 839, 845 (2019).
179.
See, e.g., Daskal, supra note 71, at 1624.
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IV. Impulses for Online Speech Regulation
The foregoing analysis of the ruling has tried to show both its limited
scope and, despite its often unclear, cryptic, and unstructured style, its overall convincing reasoning and result. Much of the criticism directed at the
ECJ does not hold up against a thorough analysis of the judgment. The limited scope of both the questions presented and the rationale supporting the
ECJ’s answers should be recognized and considered when the judgment is
inevitably scrutinized for EU law’s contribution to the regulation of online
speech.
Many questions remain unanswered. But the judgment should be read
as providing two key impulses for the future debate of Internet regulation:
ISP responsibility for illegal speech and the need for the development of
sensible rules of jurisdiction and comity in the digital era.

A. Recognizing the Problem and the Provider’s Responsibilities
1. Of Moles and Aphids
If there is a coherent theme that runs through the Glawischnig-Piesczek
judgment, it is that of an efficient protection of the rights of those harmed
by illegal online content. The ECJ understands the ECD as a framework that
adequately remedies violations of rights and interests that have occurred
online. This reading is based on a functionalist reading of art. 18(1) ECD
and its obligation for member states to ensure that courts can adopt rapid
measures to fully protect the rights and interests involved. Once illegal content is identified, EU law allows for efficient removal orders that go far beyond notice-and-takedown procedures.
These procedures, of course, stands in direct contrast to the frameworks
developed in the United States. Although applicable in copyright law, the
“DMCA Safe Harbors” of 17 U.S.C. § 512 provide an adequate point of reference in this regard, because they are designed similarly to the ECD, but
have been interpreted quite differently. Much like arts. 12–14 ECD provide
the ISPs with immunity from liability for conduiting, caching or hosting illegal content, Secs. 512(a)–(d) establish similar immunities in the copyright
180
context. Art. 15 ECD does not allow for a general obligation to monitor
181
and Sec. 512(m)(1) clarifies that the immunity cannot be conditioned on
“a service provider monitoring its service affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity”.

180.
17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)–(d).
181.
In this regard, the connection between the intensity of a monitoring obligation and
the immunities of ISPs under the ECD uncovered by Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v.
Facebook Ireland Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶¶ 36–40 (Oct. 3, 2019), is made explicit by §
512(m).
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In contrast to the ECJ’s interpretation of art. 15 ECD, Sec. 512(m) has
consistently been interpreted quite narrowly. Most prominently in cases like
Viacom v. Youtube and Capital Records v. Vimeo, it has been established
that no form of active participation can be required from service providers at
182
all. This fits rather well into the elaborate notice-and-takedown frame183
work that Sec. 512 established, but it also makes it necessary to send out
new takedown notices for every copyright violation that has occurred, leading to an endless game of “whack-a-mole” for someone who wishes to see
184
their rights protected. This inefficiency is precisely what GlawischnigPiesczek, informed by an expansive reading of art. 18 ECD, rejected.
Speech on social networks is characterized by a combination of persis185
tence in time, visibility, ability to spread, and searchability. This special
nature of social networks is explicitly highlighted by the ECJ to justify its
186
rigid stance on the removal of illegal content on these platforms. The ECJ
extends these concerns to all kinds of online content. But the serious dan187
gers of hate speech combined with the fact that many European countries
find hate speech to be unprotected illegal speech, make this orientation especially compelling in the European hate speech context. Given the nature
of social networks, a formalistic notice-and-takedown approach makes little
sense. Rather, a procedure that allows the removal of all other identical and
narrowly defined equivalent illegal content adequately neutralizes the threat.
The narrow definition of equivalent content which the ECJ advances is, insofar, an important feature to limit the solution to the problem.
Sticking with the “whack-a-mole”-metaphor, according to the vision of
the Glawischnig-Piesczek judgment, illegal online content is not like having
a mole in your garden which is only destroying your lawn when it surfaces
and can be “whacked” when it does. Rather, it is like an infestation with
aphids that are constantly multiplying and spreading through the entire garden, continuously repeating their destructive work. They can only be fought
by a broadly applied insecticide. Ideally, this insecticide only targets these
kinds of parasites and does not harm other animals and plants.
This approach requires substantial work from the ISPs. For the ECJ,
this focus on the ISPs is a natural result of art. 15 ECD’s focus on ISP obligations, which it was asked to interpret. However, it is also a statement
182.
Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 35 (2d Cir. 2012); Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 94 (2d Cir. 2013).
183.
See Emily M. Asp, Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: User Experience and User Frustration, 103 IOWA L. REV. 751, 761 (2018).
184.
Although, some argue that the current framework DMCA framework already chills
too much protected speech and should be amended. See id. at 763–64.
185.
DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 11
(2014).
186.
Case
C-18/18,
Glawischnig-Piesczek
v.
Facebook
Ireland
Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 36 (Oct. 3, 2019).
187.
See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 65–104, 204–34 (2012).
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about the inherent responsibilities of ISPs for the services they are offering.
In fact, there is nothing unusual about such a responsibility: any other company conducting a business with potential harms for society and potential
illegal outcome has the responsibility to prevent, deal with, and carry the
consequences of these potential harms and illegalities. Companies either
make sure their business does not harm people and does not violate the law,
or the service cannot be offered. This responsibility also gives these companies significant power because they are the first ones that can decide how to
comply with any given regulation. But this power is obviously subject to
judicial control. There is nothing unusual in this construction either, insofar
as companies are always primarily responsible to ensure compliance with
the law, even if their compliance decisions impact individual rights, as is the
case with health or environmental regulations. Granting not only immunity
from liability for third-party content, but also allowing for inaction when the
use of the service harms protected rights and interests in the name of inno188
vation and technological advancement subordinates these rights and interests to the economic well-being of tech-companies, who are even benefitting from this kind of traffic on their services. With a forceful grounding in
art. 18(1) ECD, the ECJ has taken the illegality of the content at issue as a
cue for allowing decisive and efficient action to eliminate illegal content,
pushing ISPs to accept the responsibility EU law has assigned to them.

2. Any Impulses for U.S. Legislation?
This European approach would run into significant difficulties in the
United States as far as speech rights are concerned. At the outset, the strictly
189
defined categories of unprotected speech, which only encompass the “his190
toric and traditional categories long familiar to the bar” severely limit the
scope of evidently illegal speech that EU law presupposes. Moreover, the
191
fact that content-based restrictions of speech are subject to strict scrutiny

188.
As was the case for the DMCA safe harbors which were hailed to be “the law that
saved the web”. David Kravets, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA Is the Law that Saved
the Web, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2008), https://www.wired.com/2008/10/ten-years-later.
189.
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010), for an exclusive list of unprotected speech with many further references.
190.
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
191.
Defined as restrictions of expression “because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content” in Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); as restrictions “adopted . . . because of the disagreement with the message [the speech] conveyed”
in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); or as “a law [that] applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed” in Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).
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192

by the Courts has plagued legislators when trying to deal with undesirable
193
speech online.
Even legislation limited to the removal of clearly unprotected speech
but including a removal obligation extending to identical and equivalent
content would need to withstand serious overbreadth and vagueness challenges under the First Amendment. Depending on its design, a statute modeled after the European example could conceivably chill a third party’s law194
195
ful speech because through the broad reach of ISP obligations, it could
196
lead to the take-down of “a substantial amount of protected speech” , unless it is susceptible to a limiting construction that would cure its unconstitu197
tional defect. Relatedly, vagueness doctrine in the First Amendment context requires an especially clear demarcation of what kind of speech is
targeted by the law and prohibits any uncertain meanings for their chilling
198
effect which will be a challenge, as the controllable, but broad formulas
used by the ECJ have shown.
Some cases seem to set a high bar for online legislation to pass muster
under this standard and make it seem unlikely that any law could stand that
does not specifically and exclusively in any given application affect unpro199
tected speech. Other, more limited versions of the overbreadth doctrine
exist in the case-law, however, making its actual force difficult to deter200
mine. Especially in the context of online harassment, courts have shown

192.
See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115, 118; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 395 (1992); Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226.
193.
See, e.g., State of North Carolina v. Bishop, 368 N.C. 869, 880 (2016) (holding a
cyberbullying statute to be a content-based restriction failing the applicable strict scrutiny
standard); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (holding a provision prohibiting transmission of obscene or indecent communications by means of telecommunications device to
persons under age 18, or sending patently offensive communications through use of interactive computer service to persons under age 18 to be unconstitutional.).
194.
See, e.g., Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987).
195.
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474 (2010).
196.
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).
197.
Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988).
198.
See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1959) (“[T]his Court has intimated that stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute
having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech.”); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109
(1972); see generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75–99 (1960).
199.
See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004).
200.
See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982) (“a law should not be invalidated for overbreadth unless it reaches a substantial number of impermissible applications”); id. at 772 (connecting the overbreadth doctrine directly to the chilling effect on protected speech a law might have); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 590
(1998) (upholding as not substantially overbroad a federal statute directing the National Endowment of the Arts, in establishing procedures to judge the artistic merit of grant applications, to take into considerations “general standards of decency and respect for the diverse
beliefs and values of the American public”).
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their willingness to construct statutes in a way that saves them from over201
breadth and vagueness challenges.
It seems difficult to conceive that the loss of some valid speech could
be balanced against the efficient removal of all harmful, unprotected speech
in U.S. law. Under a strict interpretation of the overbreadth doctrine, insisting on efficient removal of identical and equivalent content will probably
not be upheld. But this would be a construction of the overbreadth doctrine
that sanctions any conceivable application of the law without much regard
for its actual requirements.
Because the ECJ’s conception of removable identical and equivalent
content is strictly limited to content that is just as illegal as the initial content and shares all factors that led to the finding of illegality of the initial
content, the removal obligation is strictly limited to categories of defined
illegality. Mere imprecision in removal by providers for economic convenience should, in any event, not suffice to make the statute itself overbroad,
because the ISPs could rid themselves of an unwanted obligation by incompetently dealing with it. Similarly, whether the danger of over-blocking
should play a role would depend on how willing the courts are to see the
reason for such an overbroad application in the law itself, or only in the
economic considerations of ISPs that would make them block more than
they should.
In any case, legislative creativity could also limit the success of overbreadth challenges: for example, human involvement in specific cases could
be required. This involvement could take the form of a unanimous vote of a
group of informed experts in uncertain cases to remove content, essentially
limiting the removal obligation to “evidently” identical or equivalent content. This requirement might be an additional burden on ISPs, but a possible
safeguard as a matter of First Amendment law.

B. Enforcement and Power
Finally, the lack of any clear guidance concerning the global reach of
takedown orders against Internet companies evidences the need for the de202
velopment of a theory of jurisdiction and comity in the digital age. The
ECJ did not and could not have articulated such a theory in its judgment.
These questions are properly dealt with by the national courts contemplating
these issues in cases when they arise.
It seems likely that these issues, for now, will be resolved by the mechanisms of recognition and enforcement. The litigation in the United States

201.
See Lebo v. State, 474 S.W.3d 402, 406–08 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that that
communications proscribed by statute delineating offense of harassment through electronic
communication did not fall within scope of free speech protected by First Amendment, and
thus statute was not unconstitutional on its face).
202.
Kettemann & Tiedke, supra note 71.
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following the Canadian Equustek judgment illustrates how this might function. In this litigation, Google succeeded in blocking the global removal or203
der from enforcement in the United States. As already pointed out, enforcement of global removal orders is by no means always automatic.
Fundamentally, courts that issue removal orders with global reach will
inevitably run into difficulties in their enforcement abroad, as they will have
to rely on their judicial counterparts in other countries if they cannot order
the use of state power against the relevant ISP within their jurisdiction. This
enforcement leaves the companies with a significant advantage of being
able to strategically make an assessment whether they can find a way to resist orders of which they do not approve. If there are no assets in a given jurisdiction against which an order can be enforced and if the company can
count on domestic courts to reject the domestic enforcement of the foreign
204
judgment like in the Equustek litigation, such companies can effectively
resist removal orders. The economic importance of the jurisdiction that issued such a global order will likely play a significant role in deciding
whether this jurisdiction can have a say in the struggle to regulate the Internet.

Conclusion
This note has tried to thoroughly analyze the Glawischnig-Piesczek
judgment, to clarify its reasoning and actual impact and to rebut some of the
reactions it had provoked which resulted from an erroneous reading of the,
admittedly often insufficiently reasoned, judgment. Under a fair reading of
205
the judgment, it is by no means a “worst-case-scenario.” Rather, it is a
correctly limited interpretation of the ECD, endorsing swift and efficient actions to allow for the removal of illegal online content. Neither are the removal obligations too broad, nor has the Court forgotten about fundamental
rights.
Most importantly, the judgment does not provide and could not have
provided any guidance on what kind of speech should be regulated online.
206
This culturally highly sensitive topic of the limits of free speech still is
left to each European country and EU law itself does not contribute to the
now global debate concerning free speech on the Internet. Rather than shed-
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Google LLC v. Equustek Sols. Inc., No. 5:17-cv-04207-EJD, 2017 WL 50008342,
at *2–4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2017).
204.
Daskal, supra note 71, at 1631.
205.
Contra Daphne Keller (@daphnek), TWITTER (Oct. 3, 2019, 9:29 AM),
https://twitter.com/daphnehk/status/1179750220864745472.
206.
For a classic description of the German restrictions on free speech in relation to the
“Auschwitz lie”, see Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against
the “Auschwitz”—and Other—”Lies”, 85 MICH. L. REV. 277, 281–86, 288–304, 320–22
(1986).
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ding any light on this fundamental question, Glawischnig-Piesczek is instructive when it comes to the question how content that has been identified
as illegal should be handled. Glawischnig-Piesczek stands for the proposition that illegal content must be efficiently and thoroughly removed, and
that the ISP are primarily responsible in that regard. EU law now allows for,
but does not mandate, the removal of content that is identical and equivalent
to initial illegal content already brought to the attention of the ISP. This
general regulatory orientation is still foreign to U.S. law but would, with
some creativity, not crash into definitive constitutional obstacles. The (lack
of) political will to regulate the activities of ISPs seems to be more decisive
than the constitutional questions in this regard.
The judgment also does not bring and could not have brought much
clarity to the question of extraterritorial Internet regulation. Instead, the case
shows the necessity for the development of clearer standards of comity and
jurisdiction of the digital age.
In all these respects, much work remains to be done and GlawischnigPiesczek has only been one important step along the way.

